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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law-Immigration-Attorney General's Refusal of Discretionary Relief in Deportation Proceeding Not Subject to Judicial Review.

-Petitioner, an alien, entered the United States on a seaman's visa and
remained illegally for ten years. At consequent deportation proceedings,
he conceded his deportability, but requested discretionary relief from the
Attorney General under the hardship provision of Section 244(a)(5) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act.' The Attorney General, denying this application on the ground that petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements,
was upheld by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Petitioner then sought
review of the Attorney General's decision pursuant to Section 106 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act 2 which provides for review of final orders of
deportation by the courts of appeals. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, held in a five to four decision that judicial review
under section 106 was limited to fi;al orders o1 deportation and did not extend
to discretionary orders withholding or suspending such action. Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 308 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1962).
Prior to the enactment of section 106, Congress had curtailed judicial

participation in immigration affairs to a great extent.3 Complete exclusion of

the courts was impossible, however, since the detained alien's right to the
4
writ of habeas corpus provided some relief. The passage of the Adminstrative
1. 66 Stat. 163 (1952), as amended, 3 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503 (195S) (Supp. In, 1959-1961).
Section 244(a) (5) provides "the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent reidence,
in the case of an alien who ... is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien or
to his spouse, parent or child, who is a citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for pLrmanent
residence." 66 Stat. 215-16 (1952), S U.S.C. § 1254(a) (5) (195S). The provision relating to
the spouse, parent or child was not applicable in the instant case since the alien's family
remained in Italy.
2. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 3 U.S.C. § 110-a (Supp. 111, 1959-1961).
3. Congress has acted in immigration matters on the assumption that political control
over our borders is the only important consideration. See H.R. Rep. No. 1365, S2d Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-6 (1952). The courts have acquiesced in this congresional assumption. See
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United State:, 149 U.S. 693,
705-16 (1893).
4. Deportation procedure requires issuance and execution of the order. Execution involves custody to the extent that the Immigration and Naturalization Service must restrain
the alien long enough to expel him. This detention makes available the writ of habeas
corpus. See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 531 (1339); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.. 621 (1833). The
writ's scope of inquiry was first strictly limited. See Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I,
71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 424-26 (1953). Gradually, however, the writ came to be uscd as a
limited form of review, testing whether the statute had been correctly construed, whether
there was any evidence to support the order, and whether the hearing was fair. See
Gordon, judicial Review of Exclusion and Deportation, 31 Interpreter Release 74, 76-73
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and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19520 gave

renewed vigor to the role of the judiciary. The Supreme Court construed
these statutes to permit judicial review in deportation and exclusion cases, 7
thus overriding the objections of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
which considered its activities exempt from the Administrative Procedure
Act's provisions.8 This extension of judicial power by the Court provided the
stimulus for the present congressional attempt to regulate its utilization.,
The result was the passage of a bill' 0 which for the first time contained a
statutory scheme for the review of immigration proceedings." Its explicit goal
was to prevent the use of the courts merely to delay the execution of deportation and exclusion orders. 12 Section 106 rejected direct review of exclusion
orders by re-establishing habeas corpus as the only method of court participa(1954). The scope of the writ became quite broad during the period of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1917 because review of deportation orders under that statute was
denied. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953). The act provided that in every case
where an alien is ordered to be deported from the United States under the provisions of
this act, or of any law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General shall be final. 39
Stat. 889 (1917), as amended, 54 Stat. 1238 (1940). The word "final" had long been
interpreted as precluding any type of judicial review except habeas corpus. Shaughnessy v.
Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50 (1955).
5. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
6. 66 Stat. 163 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503 (1958) (Supp. III, 19591961).
7. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Shaughnessy v. Pedrelro, 349
U.S. 48 (1955). In Pedreiro, the Court stated "it is more in harmony with the generous
review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to construe the . . . word 'final'
in the . . . Act as referring to finality in the administrative procedure rather than as
cutting off the right of judicial review. . . " 349 U.S. at 51. The court in reaching Its
decision also relied on legislative history which indicated that the Administrative Procedure Act was applicable to deportation cases. Id. at 52.
8. The Service took the position that the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act were not available since hearings in immigration proceedings were required not
by statute, but merely by judicial interpretation. H.R. Rep. No. 2140, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
6 (1948). It contended further that the review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act do not apply because the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 precluded review
for the purposes of the former. See note 6 supra.
9. After the Pedreiro decision, two such bills were introduced. H.R. 9182, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956); S. 3169, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). Other bills on the subject were
introduced, culminating in a bill the provisions of which were virtually identical with
H.R. 187, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) wherein the review provisions of § 106 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act originated. See H.R. Rep. 13311, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958).
10. 75 Stat. 650 (1961), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1lOl-OSa (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
11. 75 Stat. 651-53 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § l105a (Supp. I1, 1959-1961).
12. The section originated as a separate House bill. See H.R. No. 565, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961). This urgency of prevention of judicial review was reflected on virtually
every page of the report.
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tion.' 3 Congress, however, expressly accepted direct court review of deportation orders, but severely limited its availability.1 -1
Despite this concession in section 106,15 the problem remained just how
far the courts might go in their examination. The Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit construed this section as authorizing perusal of discretionary
matters, reasoning that such matters were ancillary to the final order.'0 The
Seventh Circuit's decision was, in principle, at odds with pre-section 106
interpretations of Section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 17

under which determinations were not reviewable unless the denial of the
exercise of discretion was insufficient on its face.' 8 In Jay v. Boyd,19 the

Supreme Court stated that "discretionary determination on an application for
suspension . . . is . . . not a matter of right under any circumstances,

but... is in all cases a matter of grace." 20 The Court compared the proceeding
13. 75 Stat. 652 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § ll0a(b) (Supp. III, 1959-1961). This had the
effect of rejecting the decision in Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 US. 10 (1956),
wherein the Court held that an excluded alien might obtain judicial review of an excluson
order. Id. at 1S1.
14. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 3 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (Supp. III, 1959-1961). An alien who is
found deportable may bring a petition for review. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C.
§ ll05a(a) (1) (Supp. In, 1959-1961). The use of the term "petition for review', seems
to be an attempt to avoid repetitious suits and to create uniformity. Sea H.R. Rep. 565,
S7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). This must be done within six months of the date of the
final deportation order. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), S U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (Supp. 111, 19591961). A deportation order is deemed final when all administrative remedies have been
exhausted. 105 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1959) (remarks of Representative Lindsay). It was
also stated that "final" meant after a determination of suspension or a withholding of
deportation. Ibid. The review may be brought in the court of appeals for the circuit in
which the alien resides or where the deportation order originated. The action may not
be brought in a district court. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 3 U.S.C. § ll0a(a)(2) (Supp. I,
1959-1961). For a thorough and more comprehensive historical development of immigration and naturalization legislation see Comment, 71 Yale L.J. 760 (1962).
15. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 3 U.S.C. § l105a (Supp. In, 1959-1961).
16. Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962); Roumeliotis v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 304 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1962).
17. 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (195S).
13. Wolf v. Boyd, 23S F.2d 249, 254 (9th Cir. 1957). See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345
(1956); Schoeler v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 306 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1962);
Dentico v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 303 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 19G2); Milutin
v. Bouchard, 299 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1962); Diminich v. Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.
1961); United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnesy, 233 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 353 U.S. 72 (1957); United States ex rel. Leong Choy Mloon v. Shaughne:sy, 218
F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 205 F.2d 392
(2d Cir. 1953). See also United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 150 F2d 4S9
(2d Cir. 1950).
19. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
20. Id. at 354.
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to a denial of parole and suggested that the former is no more reviewable than
the latter. 2 ' This reasoning was uniformly accepted.22
In the instant case, the court saw nothing in section 10623 which enlarged
the scope of review as it previously existed under section 244(a). 2 4 It concluded that the procedure for determination by the Attorney General of discretionary relief was quite different from that for determining deportability
as outlined in section 242(b) .25 The court pointed out that the withholding
and suspension provisions 26 outlined no method, "let alone requiring use of
the procedure prescribed by § 242(b), to which the 1961 judicial review
amendment is keyed." 2 7 On the contrary, the majority found evidence precluding direct review in section 106(a)(4)28 which provides that the judicial
review "shall be determined solely upon the administrative record upon which
the deportation order is based. .... -29 Yet, in suspension and withholding
proceedings the Attorney General may exercise his discretion based on facts
not found in the administrative record. 30 Hence, the court concluded "if orders
withholding or denying suspension ... have been made reviewable by § 106 (a),
the standard of review must now be that provided in § 106(a) (4). .... ,1
Since the review procedure set forth in section 106(a) (4) conflicts with the
procedure for discretionary relief, the court32 reasoned that direct review of
the latter was not contemplated by Congress.
In dissenting, Judge Clark contended that when section 106 was enacted by
21. Id. at 354-55.
22. See note 18 supra.
23. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § l105a (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
24. 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1958).
25. 66 Stat. 209 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1958). In Milutin v.
Bouchard, 299 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1962), the court stated "the statute and regulations are
clearly protective of the rights of . . . [one] who, it is claimed, is subject to being deported. . . . The procedure outlined for a determination by the Attorney General...
whether the alien, though subject to deportation, shall have the order . . . withheld, Is a
different matter." Id. at 51.
26. 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1958).
27. 308 F.2d at 782.
28. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § l105a (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
29. Ibid.
30. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1956); Diminich v. Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244,
248 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 840 (1962); United States ex rel. Dolenz v.
Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1953).
31. 308 F.2d at 787.
32. Ibid. The majority also raised the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,
60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958), which exempted from judicial review an action
which "is by law committed to agency discretion." They concluded that it seemed "unlikely that Congress meant to require that a decision resting in executive grace, as to
which the scope of any review [of discretionary relief] is so narrow, must be initially
reviewed by a court of three judges-a form of review of administrative action normally
applied solely to 'quasi-judicial' agency determinations made on a record available for
the court's inspection . . . ." 308 F.2d at 782.
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Congress, it knew that the Attorney General had vested his dispensing powers
under section 244-3 in the same special inquiry officer who, under section
242(b) ,3 was to conduct proceedings to determine deportability. Congress,
therefore, must have intended to include any determination made by this
officer against the alien among orders made subject to review in the courts of
appeals. 35 This construction, Judge Clark maintained, effectuates the legislative
intent "to create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and exclusion of aliens ....
211Further, he
argued that the word "final," as used in the act necessarily includes discretionary action by the Attorney General and, therefore, such action would be
within the purview of section 106 which grants judicial review to all final orders
37
of deportatio
The majority's interpretation is more persuasive. The limited review pro-

cedure of section 106(a)(4)38 conflicts with the broad basis used by the
special inquiry officer in a determination of a section 244(a) (5) 3 petition, thus

making review impractical and unwieldy. Further, since nothing in section
10640 enlarges the previous scope of review of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 4 1 the courts advocating independent review of discretionary
33. 8 C- .R. § 244.1 (Supp. 1962) provides that "pursuant to Part 242 of this chapter
and section 244 of the Act, a special inquiry officer in his discretion may authorize the
suspension of an alien's deportation. . . ." Section 242.S(a) authorized special inquiry
officers "to determine deportability and to make decisions including orders of deportation
as provided by section 242(b) of the act . . Y and to exercise a variety of other powers.
S C.F.R. § 242.8(a) (Supp. 1962).
34. 66 Stat. 209 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1953).
35. The majority rejected this theory saying "it would be rather novel that an administrative regulation [S C.F.R. § 244.1 (Supp. 1962)] could bring something ithin
the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals which was not covered by the language that
Congress used and which, having given today, the Attorney General can take away
tomorrow..
" Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 30S F2d at 785.
36. H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2966 (1961). The majority contended that such construction would not in fact "create a
single, separate, statutory form of review," for § 105(a)(5) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 75 Stat. 651 (1952), S U.S.C. § l103a(5) (Supp. III, 1959-1961),
provides one exception which requires transfer of the proceedings from the court of appeals
to a district court when a genuine issue of United States nationality is presentcd.
37. During the House of Representative's debate on H.R. 2807, S6th Cong, 1st Ss.
(1959), Representative Walter, author of the bill and co-author of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 agreed, as did
the committee reporter, Representative Moore, with a statement made by Reprezcntative
Lindsay: "[If there is any remedy on the administrative level left of any nature, that
the deportation order will not be considered final." 105 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1959).
38. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), S U.S.C. § l105a (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
39. 66 Stat. 215-16 (1952), 3 U..C. § 1254(a)(5) (1958).
40. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (Supp. IIIM, 1959-1961). Sea notes 29 & 30
supra and accompanying text.
41. 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1953). The courts, in construing this
section, held discretionary immigration determinations not reviewable. See note 13 supra.
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immigration determinations 42 appear to be without statutory authority. A
liberal construction of section 10643 would conflict with the legislative intent and
44
create delay in execution of an order specifically sought to be expeditious.

Constitutional Law-Federal Censorship-Revised Standard for Obsccnity.--Petitioners were publishers of three magazines' which consisted of
photographs of nude and semi-nude male models. Accompanying each photo
was the name of the model and the name and address of the photographer.
Suspecting the materials to be nonmailable under Section 1461 of the United
States Code, 2 the local postmaster withheld delivery. At an official Post Office
hearing the magazines were adjudged obscene, and on appeal the ruling was
affirmed on the ground that the matter tended to arouse the prurient interest
of the average homosexual. 3 Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for a divided Supreme
Court,4 reversed, holding that the materials failed to meet the requirement
42. Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962); Roumeliotis v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 304 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1962).
43. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
44. See H.R. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
1. MANual, Trim and Grecian Guild Pictorial.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958) provides in part: "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent,
filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance; and ...every written or printed
card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving Information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such
mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained or made . . is declared to be
nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post
office or by any letter carrier. Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage
in the mails, or delivery of anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at
which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, or knowingly
takes any such thing from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing thereof,
or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first such offense, and shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, for each such
offense thereafter."
3. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
4. Mr. Justice Stewart joined in the opinion of the Court and Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Chief Justice Warren joined In Mr.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion. Addressing himself to the question of whether under
§ 1461, a part of the Criminal Code, the Postmaster General is authorized to censor
obscenity at the administrative level without recourse first to judicial determination of
same, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that the postal authorities acted ultra vires In that
"Congress has not, in § 1461, authorized the Postmaster General to employ any process
of his own to close the mails to matter which, in his view, falls within the ban of that
section. 'The provisions . . .would have to be far more explicit for us to assume that
Congress made such a radical departure from our traditions and undertook to clothe the
Postmaster General with the power to supervise the tastes of the reading public of the
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of being patently offensive so as to violate "the national standard of decency."5
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 4SS (1962).
The problem of governmental censorship, and particularly that of determining
an adequate standard for judging the obscene, is not a recent one.0 But,
although cases date back to 1663, 7 the formulation of a norm was uniformly
avoided8 until 1867, when Lord Cockburn, in Regina v. Hicklin,0 pronounced
the following test:
[Wi'hether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands

a publication of this sort may fall. 10

This standard allows a work to be judged by the reading of an isolated
passage, takes no notice of any artistic or scientific value the material may
possess and considers the motive of the author immaterial.
In 1873, an omnibus federal anti-obscenity law was passed, which included
the postal provisions now known as section 1461.11 In quick succession the
courts confirmed the constitutionality of these provisions'-' and implemented
them by quoting verbatim the Hicklin test as the proper one for determining
country.'" Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 519 (1962). Mr. Justice Clark,
dissenting, characterized § 1461 as a clear congressional mandate authorizing "the
Postmaster General through administrative process to close the mails to matter included
within its proscriptions." Id. at 520. Justices White and Frankfurter took no part in the
decision.
5. Regarding the alleged violation of the advertising provisions of § 1461, Mr. Justice
Harlan held that the Government failed to sustain its burden of proof in that it had not
proved scienter on the part of the publishers of the admittedly obscene materials which
were being offered for sale. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 US. 473, 492-95. In his
dissent, Mr. Justice Clark thought the element of scienter was "immaterial" in a dvil
proceeding, and even under the assumption of its necessity, felt that "the undisputed facts
...compel as a matter of lawr" the conclusion that it had been established. Id. at 526.
6. For excellent discussions of the myriad problems involved, see Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5,
49-121 (1960); Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems
of Federal Censorship, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 214 (1957).
7. Sir Charles Sydlyes Case, 1 Keble 620, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K.B. 1663). This case
actually dealt with indecent exposure and trespass vi et armis: the defendant stood nal:ed on
a balcony and tossed bottles at the populace below.
8. Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727). Early American cases
did likewise. See, e.g., Knowles v. State, 3 Day 103 (Conn. I03) ; Commonwealth v. Holmes,
17 lass. (16 Tyng) 335 (1S21); State v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315 (1357); Commonwealth
v. Sharpless, 2 S.& R. 91 (Pa. 1815).
9. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (16s).
10. Id. at 371.
11. 19 Stat. 90 (1876). See Paul & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 217-18.
12. In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), a case in which the issue concerned the
power of Congress to regulate the mails, the Court, in sweeping dicta, passed on the
constitutionality of the forerunner of § 1461 stating "the only question for our determination
relates to the constitutionality of the act; and of that we have no doubt." Id. at 737.
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what was obscene.' 3 Uniformly applied for more than half a century to the
extent of becoming so widely accepted that even those who personally opposed
it felt compelled to adhere,'1 4 it was not until the 1930's that any alteration
was attempted.
United States v. Dennett'6 reversed the conviction of a woman for the
sale of a pamphlet designed for children and dealing with a frank portrayal of
the facts of life. Finding it to be "an accurate exposition of the relevant facts
of the sex side of life [phrased] in decent language and in manifestly serious
and disinterested spirit,"'16 the court declared that the pamphlet was not
obscene since
any incidental tendency to arouse sex impulses . . . is apart from and subordinate
to its main effect . . . . The direct aim and the net result is to promote under17
standing and self-control.

Three years later, when called upon to decide the acceptability of Joyce's
Ulysses,' 8 the judiciary again emphasized this "net result" test. The trial court
conceded that while the book contained a "recurrent emergence of the theme
of sex,"' 9 it displayed nowhere "the leer of the sensualist. '20 Judge Woolsey
held the book was not obscene since, when read in its entirety, it did not tend
to "excite sexual impulses or lustful thoughts" 2 ' for the normal person. On
appeal, while characterizing the work as "sincere, truthful, relevant to the
13. United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, 1102 (No. 14571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879).
14. Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486 (1897); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29
(1896); Burton v. United States, 142 Fed. 57 (Sth Cir. 1906); United States v. Smith, 45
Fed. 476 (E.D. Wis. 1891); United States v. Clarke, 38 Fed. 732 (E.D. Mo. 1889); United
States v. Wightman, 29 Fed. 636 (W.D. Pa. 1886); United States v. Bebout, 28 Fed. 522
(N.D. Ohio 1886); United States v. Britton, 17 Fed. 731 (S.D. Ohio 1883). Indeed, Judge
Learned Hand was almost apologetic for expressing disapproval of the test. "I hope It
is not improper for me to say that the rule as laid down . . . does not seem to me to
answer to the understanding and morality of the present time . . . . [ilt seems hardly
likely that we are even to-day . . . content to reduce our treatment of sex to the standard
of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few ....

I scarcely think that

they [the public at large] would forbid all which might corrupt the most corruptible, or
that society is prepared to accept for its own limitations those which may perhaps be
necessary to the weakest of its members. If there be no abstract definition, such as I have
suggested, should not the word 'obscene' be allowed to indicate the present critical point
in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived
here and now?" United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
15. 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
16. Id. at 569.
17. Ibid.
18. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). The
case involved a construction of § 305(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, which forbids the
importation of any "obscene" book. 46 Stat. 688, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (a) (1958).
19. 5 F. Supp. at 184.
20. Id. at 183.
21. Id. at 185.
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subject, and executed with real art,"' the court recognized it to be "in not
a few spots . . . blasphemous, and obscene,1 23 but nevertheless adhered to
the lower court's ruling declaring, "the question in each case is whether a
publication taken as a whole has a libidinous effect," 2 and "the proper test
of whether a given book is obscene is its dominant effect."0 In view of
subsequent developments, it should be noted that both courts first arrived
at a determination that the book was not "pornographic." Two years later, in
United States v. Levine,-' the scope of the test was given further refinement:
[W]hat counts is its effect, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom
it is likely to reach. . . The standard must be the likelihood that the work will
so much arouse the salacity of the reader to whom it is sent as to outweigh any
literary, scientific or other merits ....27
In 1940, Parmelee v. United States,2 s pointed out the established precept that
nudity is not obscene per se, and, hence, employing the test formulated in
Ulysses, found the challenged nudist photographs unobjectionable, since they
were used "to accompany an honest, sincere, scientific and educational study and
exposition of a sociological phenomenon. . ... ,2 Similarly, in Walkcr v.
Popeiwe,30 the court held a booklet which contained a frank discussion of the
function of the sex organs was not obscene and noted its "purely educational
purpose and ...uniformly decent language." 3'
These decisions display a definite pattern regarding the evolution of a new
test for obscenity. A work must be judged in its entirety in light of its dominant
theme and its effect upon the average likely reader.2
In 1957, the Supreme Court, in Roth v. United States,33 first passed upon
22.
23.

72 F.2d at 706.
Id. at 707.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Ibid.
Id. at 703.
83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
Id. at 157-58.

28.
29.

113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
Id. at 735.

30. 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945).

31. Id. at 512.
32. In addition to the Levine ruling, there are many decisions which have limited the
application of the test for obscenity to a publication's most probable readerhip. Se, e.,
One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 371
(1958) ("effect . . . upon the reader"); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731

(D.C. Cir. 1940) ("all those whom it is likely to reach"); United States v. Dennett, 39
F.2d 564, 563 (2d Cir. 1930) ("those into whose hands the publication might fall"); United
States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760, 762 (NJD. Cal. 1951), aff'd sub nom. BesIg
v. United States, 203 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) ("'those whose minds are open to such
influences and into whose hands (the material] may fall . . . ."'); United States,- .
Goldstein, 73 F. Supp. 375, S77 (D.NJ. 1947) ("those into whose hands the publication

might fall").
33. 354 US. 476 (1957).
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this test. Ironically, the decision did not concern itself with the issue of the
obscenity of the material involved. Mr. Justice Brennan announced the
dispositive question to be "whether obscenity is utterance within the area
of protected speech and press." 34 However, in holding that the first amendment
was not violated by section 1461, "applied according to the proper standard
for judging obscenity," 35 the Court necessarily took up the issue of an appropriate test. In essence, it approved the standard set down in Ulysses, stating the
norm to be:
[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest 0a
Echoing Levine,37 Mr. Justice Brennan emphasized that the effect of the
material must be judged by the reaction " 'not upon any particular class, but
upon all those whom it is likely to reach.' "38 Significantly, he justified the
finding that obscenity was without the pale of a constitutionally protected
"utterance" by characterizing, and thus further defining it, as that which is
"utterly without redeeming social importance." '0
Mr. Justice Harlan, in voting to reverse the conviction of Roth, expressed
concern over the "disarming generalizations ' 40 of the majority, and warned
of "the very real danger of a deadening uniformity which can result from
nation-wide federal censorship .... "41 He also made a statement which casts
light on his decision in the instant case:
I do not think that the federal statute can
be constitutionally construed to reach
42
other than . . . "hard-core" pornography.
Several lower court decisions followed the Roth determination. In United
States v. 31 Photographs,43 a district court held certain "erotic' 44 photographs
and books sought to be imported by the Institute for Sex Research of the
University of Indiana not to be obscene. The Institute filed affidavits to the
effect that the materials would be kept under security and made accessible
only to scholars engaged in serious research. The court, confronted with
construing the words "average person," stated:
34. 354 U.S. at 481.
35. Id. at 492.
36. See notes 26 & 27 supra and accompanying text.
37. 354 U.S. at 489.
38. Id. at 490.
39. Id. at 484.
40. Id. at 496 (concurring opinion).
41. Id. at 506. Mr. justice Harlan does not seem to disapprove of censorship as a
matter of principle. Indeed, he appears to sanction it on the local level in the interest of
"social experimentation." Id. at 503-06.
42. Id. at 507.
43. 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). For a provocative discussion of the implications
of the court's holding see Note, 34 Ind. L.J. 426 (1959).
44. 156 F. Supp. at 352.

19631

CASE NOTES

To whose prurient interest must the work appeal? While the rule is often stated in
terms of the appeal of the material to the "average person," ... it must be borne in
mind that the cases applying the standard in this manner do so in regard to material
which is to be distributed to the public at large. I believe, however, that the more
inclusive statement of the definition is that which judges the material by its appeal
to "all those whom it is likely to reach." Viewed in this light, the "average man"
test is but a particular application of the rule, often found in the cases only because
the cases often deal with material which is distributed to the public at large.5
Grove Press, Iic. v. Christenberry40 called for a determination as to the
alleged obscenity of the unexpurgated edition of Lady Chattcrlcy's Lover.
Both the district and circuit courts found little difficulty in finding the novel
not to be obscene within the Roth formula. Both decisions are replete with
evidence of the publisher's good faith and the work's literary merit. T Using
Mr. Justice Brennan's phraseology, the district court pointed out that the
Roth test is broad enough so that in order to be adjudged obscene, the dominant
theme which appeals to prurient interest "must so predominate as to submerge
any ideas of 'redeeming social importance' ....
,s So construed, the
question of the adequacy of the Roth standard was raised by the Supreme
Court in the present case. It is submitted that the Court's decision represents
a sharp deviation from the established trend of case law. The circuit court's
construction of "average person" as average likely recipient rather than the
public at large (regarding material circulated among homosexuals exclusively)
is in accord with virtually every case in point.
45. Id. at 354-55. It should be noted in this connection that the studies of the American
Law Institute, upon which Mr. Justice Harlan appears to rely heavily in the instant case,
sets forth, in the very section which he cites, that class in terms of whose reaction the
material is to be judged: "Obscenity shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults,
except that it shall be judged with reference to children or other specially susceptible
audience if it appears from the character of the material or the circumstances of its dissemination to be specially designed for or directed to such an audience." Model Penal Code
§ 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
46. 175 F. Supp. 4SS (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
47. 175 F. Supp. at 497-503; 276 F.2d at 437-3S.
4S. 175 F. Supp. at 499. During the term following the Roth decision, the Supreme Court
reversed two circuit court findings simply by citing Roth. In One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d
772 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 371 (195S) the issue involved the circulation of a publication designed for homosexuals. In the other case, Sunshine Book Co. v.
Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiara, 355 U.S. 372 (1953), the
question arose as to the mailing of two pseudo-scientific nudist magazines. While some
commentators saw in these reversals a possible deviation from the Roth test, there is
ample evidence that no such change in the standard was necessary to justify the reversals.
One, Inc. cites several "approved definitions," all of which have a Hicklin gloss and emphasize objectionable segments without discussing the publication's theme. 241 F.2d at
775-78. Sunshine Book Co. contains a vigorous dissent based on disapproval of the test
employed by the majority which it claims is not the Roth formula. 249 F.2d at 120-23.
Cf. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 6, at 32-39; Comment, Per Curiam Decisions of the
Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279, 309-13 (1959).
49. See notes 32 & 45 supra and accompanying text.
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Mr. Justice Harlan acknowledged that the magazines in question would
appeal to the prurient interests of homosexuals and that they would be read
"almost entirely" by these sexual deviates.r ° However, he ignored this finding
and did not pass upon the circuit court's construction of "avarage person." He
considered it unnecessary since he found the average person test was not
the sole determinant of obscenity. Section 1461 condemns material irrespective
of its effect. It demands also that it be patently offensive on its face "so as
to affront current community standards of decency."'" Since the provision is
part of a federal statute, "the relevant 'community' in terms of whose standards
of decency the issue must be judged ' 52 is the nation. Hence, the proper test
emerges as: Whether the challenged material is so offensive on its face as to
violate the national standard of decency. Mr. Justice Harlan contended that
without such a test "the American public [would be] in jeopardy of being
denied access to many worthwhile works in literature, science, or art."53 He also
noted that "only in the unusual instance where ...the 'prurient interest' appeal of the material is found limited to a particular class of persons that
occasion arises for a truly independent inquiry into the question whether or not
the material is patently offensive."'54 It is submitted that these words clearly
indicate that the test traditionally reserved for judging materials distributed to
the public at large is now to be imposed upon those circulated only among a
limited class. As a result, material which admittedly is designed to arouse
erotic sexual response in homosexuals will no longer be censored unless it can
be shown that the material will also stimulate the prurient interests of the
public at large to whom it is not distributed.
In so eradicating the distinction between tests based upon distribution, Mr.
Justice Harlan appears to be vindicating his own belief that the federal
government can only proscribe hard-core pornography,r and simultaneously
defining and establishing the same as the universal test for adjudging the
obscene. Such a position conflicts with the established trend in case law which
repeatedly censored obscenity, classified as such, distinct from hard-core
pornography which was often characterized as the most extreme form of
obscenity.5 6
By establishing a universally applicable "national standard of decency" test,
Mr. Justice Harlan has taken issue with Mr. Justice Brennan's description of
obscenity as that which is "utterly without redeeming social importance." 5'
50. 370 U.S. at 481.
51. Id. at 482.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 488.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 486.
See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
The term "hard-core pornography" appears to remain a term of art. Aside from
referring to it as either "dirt for dirt's sake," United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses,"
5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), or as "dirt for money's sake," Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 692 (1959) (concurring
opinion), it remains judicially undefined.
57. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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No longer need a questionable publication possess any literary or scientific merit
to escape condemnation. Contrary to the entire line of cases which culminated
in the test set forth in Roth, unless it can be shown that the material affronts
the national standard of decency, a work designed to appeal to the erotic
impulses of deviates will avoid proscription.
Is there any necessity for such a revised standard? Under the tests laid down
in Ulysses and Roth, neither the novels of Joyce and Lawrence, nor the "erotic"
materials used in Indiana University's research were adjudged obscene. At the
same time many publications circulated to disturb the weak and the sick were
denied access to the public. The flexible "average person" test, construed as
average likely recipient, proved to be a workable instrument for the equitable
enforcement of federal censorship. The "national standard of decency" test,
however, cannot help but have an inhibitory effect. Strictly construed, it may
create a situation whereby failure to enforce section 1461 will amount to its
repeal.

Constitutional Law-Full Faith and Credit Need Not Be Accorded to a
Final Foreign Adminitrative Tax. Determination.-Defendant, a former
resident of Philadelphia, operated a parking lot business there from 1954 to
1959. During this time, he was subject to a local tax' of ten per cent upon the
monthly receipts collected by parking lot operators. During the years 1954
to 1959, the defendant made the payments as prescribed. An audit revealed,
however, that his actual gross receipts exceeded the amount which he reported.
Accordingly, the municipality made an assessment in 1958 of approximately
five thousand dollars, covering the four year period, and sent notice to the
defendant. From the receipt of such notice, a period of sixty days 2 was allowed
by the ordinance within which a petition for review of the assessment might
be brought. The defendant neither petitioned for a review nor paid the assessment, 3 but left Philadelphia and moved to New York.
In an action by the foreign municipality to enforce the tax assessment, the
New York Supreme Court dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. This decision was affirmed by both the appellate
division 4 and the court of appeals, 5 the latter holding that New York courts
might decline to sit on a tax controversy between another state and its former
citizens, since to entertain such a dispute "would be an intrusion into the public
1. Philadelphia Code of Gen. Ordinances ch. 19-1200 (1956).
2. Philadelphia Code of Gen. Ordinances ch. 19-1702 (1956).
3. The defendant, not having availed himself of the appeal provision, made this administrative determination a final adjudication of his liability. See City of Philadelphia v.
Bobman Dep't Store Co., 1S9 Pa. Super. 72, 149 A.2d 513 (1959).
4. City of Philadelphia . Cohen, 15 App. Div. 2d 464, 222 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1st Dcp't
1961) (memorandum decision).
5. City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 134 N.E.2d 167, 230 N.Y.S.2d 133,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 934 (1962).
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affairs of another State.
...
6 City of Philadelphiav. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401,
184 N.E.2d 167, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 934 (1962).
Assuming that the municipal taxing ordinance was a "public act" and
that defendant's liability had become "perfect and complete," 7 the court of
appeals nevertheless concluded that "no case law anywhere requires the courts
of New York to entertain this suit . . . by compulsion of 'Full Faith and
Credit' .... "8 Chief Judge Desmond, writing for the majority, found that the
question of whether full faith and credit must be accorded by one state to the
nonjudicial tax assessments of another was of first impression for any state court
of last resort or any federal appellate court. Thus with no authoritative statement of the law regarding this constitutional issue, the majority determined
that the public policy of New York forbade its courts from acting
as collectors of taxes for another State . .

.

. [since] for our tribunals to sit in judge-

ment on a tax controversy between another State and its present or former citizens
would be an intrusion into the public affairs of another State. ....
.

In his dissent, Judge Fuld agreed that full faith and credit did not require
New York to entertain a suit which would involve the adjudication and resolution of an individual's tax obligation under foreign laws, but opposed the result
reached by the majority on the ground that plaintiff's suit was not based upon
"the underlying tax liability, but [upon] a final administrative determination
that has, in essence, the same force and effect as a judgment."' 1 Thus, since
this determination was res judicata as to the defendant's liability, it should be
accorded the same full faith and credit as a judgment.
Under the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Milwaukee
County v. White Co.," where a defendant's tax liability has been reduced
to a judgment in the taxing state, such a judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit in a foreign forum since the original cause of action, though based
upon tax liability, merges with the judgment. Like any other judgment, therefore, it can be attacked when sought to be enforced in a foreign forum, only
if subject to attack in the state which entered it.'2 Recognition of such a judgment by a foreign court, therefore, would not involve any investigation into, or
application of, the foreign revenue laws.
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that:
6. Id. at 406, 184 N.E.2d at 169, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
7. Id. at 405, 184 N.E.2d at 169, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
8. Id. at 406, 184 N.E.2d at 169, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 407, 184 N.E.2d at 170, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
11. 296 U.S. 268 (1935). See also other obligations to pay money arising under the laws
of foreign forums, which must be given full faith and credit: Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S.
629 (1935) ; Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) ; Converse v. Hamilton,
224 U.S. 243 (1912).
12. 296 U.S. 268 (1935). "Recovery upon . .. [the judgment] can be resisted only on
the grounds that the court which rendered it was without jurisdiction. . . ." Id. at 275.

1963]

163]CASE

NOTES

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
Judicial Proceedings of every other StateY3
Underlying the full faith and credit clause is "the strong unifying principle...
looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights
created or recognized by the statutes of sister states ...... .I Under the power
bestowed upon it by this clause,' 9 Congress has included acts and records of
nonjudicial nature as well as judicial within the scope of full faith and credit. 10
Although neither the constitutional requirement nor federal legislation gives
the statutes of one state extraterritorial effect, 17 full faith and credit does
require recognition by a state of obligations imposed and rights conferred, 8
which have been judicially determined by foreign forums pursuant to foreign
statutes. Full faith and credit requires a state to accept judicial determinations
of foreign courts as conclusive on the merits 9 where such foreign judgments
are sued on or asserted as defenses. Whether decisions rendered by foreign
administrative boards pursuant to taxing statutes of foreign states would be
"reduced to judgment" within the rule of Milwaukee County has never been
specifically decided.
In Broderik v. Rosner; ° however, the Supreme Court held that an administrative assessment made by the Superintendent of Banks of New York was
entitled to full faith and credit in New Jersey. The Court emphasized the finality of the foreign determination, even though only administrative in nature. It
stated:
The fact that the assessment here in question was made under statutory direction
by an administrative officer does not preclude the application of the full faith and
credit clause. 2 '
Likewise, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt22 held that foreign worhmen's
13. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
14. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
15. "And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738-39 (1958).

17. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 305 U.S. 493, 502 (1939).
13. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); John Hancock Mlut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates,
299 U.S. 178 (1936); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Bradford Elec. Light Co.

v. Clapper, 2S6 U.S. 145 (1932). Note, however, that the full faith and credit dauza does
not apply to: foreign penal laws, Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) ; foreign statutes
of limitation, Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 356 (1914); nor to
foreign statutes which effect the determination of property rights of the r-s located in
another state, Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386, 38S (1910).
19. Therefore, the full faith and credit clause does not allow the state into which the
foreign forum's judgment is brought to re-examine it on the merits, Hanley v. Donogbue,
116 U.S. 1, 4 (1S5), even if the court rendering the judgment committed error in construing its own forum's statutes, Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1903).
20. 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
21. Id. at 644.
22. 320 U.S. 430 (1943)
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compensation awards-also administrative in nature-were entitled to full
faith and credit in the state of the forum. As Milwaukee County2 3 had held
that there was nothing inherent in the tax nature of a foreign judgment that
precluded the according of full faith and credit by a forum, so did Rosner and
Hunt intimate that the foreign determinations should not be denied full faith
and credit merely because they were administrative. The logical synthesis of
the principles set out in Milwaukee County, Hunt and Rosner, therefore, would
seem to indicate that the final tax determination of a foreign state should be
accorded full faith and credit even though such a determination is administrative. A Massachusetts federal district court, apparently recognizing the
validity of this reasoning, held in City of New York v. Shapiro24 that an
administrative determination of tax liability is entitled to full faith and
credit, because
administrative determinations, if they create in their home state new obligations,
by independent suit or by process equally
and if those new obligations are enforceable 25
effective, can be sued upon in a sister state.
Since the instant administrative determination was final, 20 it satisfied the
requirement of res judicata. In refusing to recognize the judgment merely
because it was administrative, the New York Court of Appeals has determined
the issue on the somewhat arbitrary basis that "no case law [authority] anywhere requires the courts of New York to entertain this suit ...

by compulsion

of 'Full Faith and Credit' . ... ,,27 Certainly, the rationales of Milwaukee
County, Hunt and Rosner as crystallized in Shapiro would indicate a different
result.
Finding no constitutional mandate to recognize the Philadelphia tax
assessment, the instant court found that New York public policy forbade "suits
to collect the taxes of other States," 28 since to entertain such suits would
involve "an intrusion into the public affairs of another State. '' 29 In 1962, the
New York legislature enacted Article 25 of the State Tax Law, extending
recognition by New York to "liabilities for taxes lawfully imposed by any other
state ...

which extends a like comity to this state ..

."30 To the extent that

this statute extends recognition on the basis of reciprocity, it is in derogation
of the settled New York public policy which forbids "intrusion into the public
23. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
24. 129 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass. 1954). In this case the treasurer of New York City made
an administrative determination of tax liability, against two Massachusetts residents, on
use and business taxes for conducting a business in New York. The court noted that since
the defendants had not availed themselves of the review procedure available under the
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, the administrative determination had become "a final, binding, and
new obligation." Id. at 153.
25. Id. at 154.
26. See note 3 supra.
27. 11 N.Y.2d at 406, 184 N.E.2d at 169, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
28. Id. at 404, 184 N.E.2d at 168, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
29. See note 27 supra.
30. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 677, § 902, at 2180.
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affairs of another State. .... -31 It is arguable that the legislature has, in effect,
rejected "intrusion" as a basis for New York public policy altogether and
substituted "reciprocity." The instant court stated that "the Legislature has
given us new, strong evidence of our State's public policy. . . .
More
accurately, perhaps the legislature has formulated a new public policy.
Other courts, where the taxing state had a reciprocity statute, have recognized foreign tax assessments on the basis of comity.33 In Ohlazoma v.
Neely, 34 for example, one state maintained an action for taxes due in the courts
of a sister state against residents of the sister state. Both states had reciprocity
statutes similiar to New York's. 35 While granting judgment for plaintiff, the
court noted that the plaintiff could have maintained the action ccn if reciprocity did not exist between the two states, 36 and that the purpose of the
forum's reciprocity statute was merely to take advantage of other state's statute
of the same nature. 37 The Supreme Court of Illinois, in City of Detroit v.
Gould,35 recently reached, in an identical factual situation, a result contrary
to the instant decision solely on the basis of comity. Gould, however, was not
based upon reciprocity since there was no reciprocity statute.
In holding that New York has no obligation under the full faith and credit
clause merely because the question was never specifically decided, the instant
court admitted that the question was subject to final determination 9 by the
Supreme Court. The question left open in Milwankee Coanty ° demands timely
resolution in order that the pressing uncertainty facing many local taxing
authorities be resolved.

Constitutional Law-Power of Congressional Committee To Investigate
an Interstate Compact Denied Due to Lack of Grant of Specific Authority.-Appellant, the executive director of the Port of New York Authority,'
was subpoenaed to appear and produce certain records before a subcommittee
31.

See note 27 supra.

32. Ibid.
33. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 23S Mo. App. 111, 193 S.W.2d 919
(Mlo. Ct. App. 1946); Lafoon v. Kerner, 138 N.C. 2S1, 50 S.E. 654 (1905).
34. 225 Ark. 230, 2S2 S.W.2d 150 (1955).
35. See note 30 supra.
36. 225 Ark. at 232, 282 S.11.2d at 151.
37. Id. at 234, 282 S.W.2d at 152.
3S. 12 MII.2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (1957).
39. See petition for certiorari filed, 31 U.S.L. Week 3119 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1962).
40. The issue was whether the full faith and credit clause should apply to a foreign
forum's tax statutes and also to administrative determinations which are res judicata as to
assessed taxes thereunder.
1. The Port of New York Authority is a corporate bi-state agency of New Jerzey and
New York. It was created in 1921 by a compact between the two states with the consent
of Congress to deal with the planning and development of terminal and transportation
facilities and to improve and protect the commerce of the port district.
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of the House Judiciary Committee. Following appellant's appearance and
refusal to produce all of the records requested, 2 the House of Representatives
voted to cite him for contempt.3 He was subsequently charged by information
and convicted of criminal contempt of Congress in the district court.4 The
court of appeals, in reversing the conviction, held that the subcommittee's investigative authority was exhausted by the information actually tendered by
the appellant and that the documents refused to the subcommittee were outside
of the jurisdictional authority vested in the House Judiciary Committee. Tobin
v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902
(1962).
In holding that the subcommittee had exceeded its delegated powers, the
court of appeals construed its grant of authority narrowly in an express effort
to avoid the constitutional questions involved. The district court, interpreting
the same authorizing resolutions, reached a contrary conclusion and held that
it was clear
from the language, context, and floor discussion preceding passage of the June 1
resolution that it authorized an investigation of much greater depth than defendant
argues ....

[And that] the resolution itself is unqualified. .....

Having decided that the subcommittee was acting within its grant of authority,
the court went on to resolve the other issues involved. The more important
ones, from a constitutional point of view, were whether the committee had a
proper legislative purpose in conducting the inquiry and whether the subject
matter of the inquiry was pertinent. Both of these questions were resolved in
7
favor of the Government.
The court of appeals found that the applicable resolutions had given the
subcommittee authority " 'to conduct full and complete investigations and
studies relating to . . . the activities and operations of interstate compacts.' ,,
2. Mr. Tobin did produce Port Authority bylaws, organization manuals, rules and
regulations, annual financial reports, and minutes of meetings of its Board of Commissioners. He also furnished additional unsubpoenaed material and offered to answer any
questions about the Authority on oral examination. However, he did not produce certain
internal documents including financial and management reports, agenda of meetings, staff
reports, and other communications pertaining to dealings and policies of the Authority
in the fields of construction, insurance, public relations, real estate, revenue bonds and
rail transportation. United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 592 (D.D.C. 1961).
3. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 272 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962).
4. United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1961).
5. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d at 276 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
6. 195 F. Supp. at 599.
7. Id. at 600-08.
8. 306 F.2d at 275. "The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 granted to the Judiciary
Committee authority over nineteen subjects, including 'interstate compacts generally.' 60
Stat. 812, 826-27; Rule XI (1). In 1959, the Committee was given subpoena power to
conduct 'full and complete investigations and studies relating to [certain stated matters]
coming within the jurisdiction of the Committee.' H.R. Res. 27, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
As this last grant of authority did not encompass interstate compacts, it was amended on
June 1, 1960, to include 'the activities and operations of interstate compacts.' H.R. Res.
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It construed them narrowly because of the allegation of criminal liability present in the case.9 Curiously enough, it cited as support for its position one of
the identical arguments raised by the district court-the floor discussion
preceding passage of the resolution. The court of appeals was "impressed by the
absence of any truly enlightening or informative floor discussion," 10 while
the district court alluded directly to a specific statement made by a member
of the rules committe to the effect
"that the committee does not expect to use or abuse this power through a great many
investigations but, instead, go look into one particular State's compact [sic] where,
under present laws and under the compact, there is no control or lmowledge of just
how a great many public funds are being expended.""
The latter statement is not inconsistent with the view taken by the court
of appeals. It interpreted the authorizing resolutions
to mean that the Judiciary Committee was empowered to conduct an investigation
calling for documents relating to actual "activities and operations" of the authority
rather than for all of the administrative communications, internal memoranda, and
other intra-Authority documents demanded by the subpoena in question. .. . The
information refused to the Subcommittee related only to the why of Authority
activity... .
Thus, when Congressman Brown spoke of the lack of knowledge of "'just
how a great many public funds are being expended,' "13 he could well have
been emphasizing the need for more information as to what the Port Authority
was doing. Documents spelling out how the public funds were being expended and
what activities and operations the Port Authority was engaged in were never
denied to the subcommittee.' 4 This interpretation seems the more logical of
the two; especially in view of the argument raised by the court of appeals that
such a unique congressional investigation would certainly have received more
explicit authorization if, in fact, it was intended}1 Congress had never before
in its entire investigative history conducted such an extensive inquiry into an
interstate compact agency. Had such unprecedented probes in depth been contemplated, it seems likely that Congress would have stipulated more specifically
just how far the subcommittee could have proceeded. It was, in fact, given no
authorization other than the general resolutions which were applicable to all
investigations into interstate compacts. At the time the House passed the June
530, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). Putting these resolutions of authority together, we find
that the Committee was given jurisdiction over 'interstate compacts generally,' and the
power 'to conduct full and complete investigations and studies relating to . . . the activities and operations of interstate compacts."
9. Id. at 274.
10. Id. at 275 n.9.
11.

195 F. Supp. at 599.

12. 306 F.2d at 275-76.
13. 195 F. Supp. at 599. (Emphasis added.) See also text accompanying note 11 supra.
14. 305 F.2d at 276.
15.

Id. at 275.
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1, 1960 resolution, its members were not even aware of the subcommittee's intent to subpoena internal documents. 16 It seems apparent then that Congress
anticipated a general investigation under the general powers rather than a
specific and detailed inquiry. On the basis of such facts, the court's analysis
was sound, even aside from the criminal question involved. Had proper
authorization been found, and no doubt it will be delegated specifically
before the next investigation of this type, the court would have been faced
squarely with the constitutional questions involved.
In dictum, unhampered by the presence of criminal charges, the court
found appellant's argument
that the committee had no proper legislative purpose
"not unpersuasive."'' 7 The argument was based on the theory that Congress
has no right under the compact clause of the Constitution to alter, amend,
or repeal its previous consent to interstate compacts. Congress had specifically
reserved this power to itself upon granting consent to the compact in question, 8
but such reservation could hardly effectuate a power not otherwise found either
expressly or impliedly in the Constitution. There was no dispute here as to the
lack of express delegation. The issue then was whether such power could
properly be implied from that portion of the Constitution dealing with interstate
compacts, the "compact clause."' 9 It states only that "No State shall, without
the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State. ....
",20 Appellant contended that this clause was to be construed literally in that Congress' only power with regard to interstate compacts
was a review power, i.e., to either grant or withhold consent, but nothing more.
Prior to the enactment of the Constitution, the use of compacts was already
widespread and was assumed to be a proper exercise of state power. 21 It was
frequently utilized as a means of solving boundary disputes. 22 In 1837, the
Supreme Court, in referring to this compact power, said:
It is a right equally belonging to the states of this Union, unless it has been surrendered,
under the constitution of the United States. So far from there being any pretence
of such a general surrender of the right, it is expressly recognised by the constitution
and guarded23in its exercise by a single limitation or restriction, requiring the consent
of congress.
16. The June 1, 1960 resolution, H.R. Res. 530, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), was introduced May 17, 1960. There is no indication in the Congressional Record of that date or of
June 1, 1960, that the House had been informed that a demand would be made for Internal
files of the Port Authority.
17. 306 F.2d at 274.
18. This is a standard provision which is one of several normally included by Congress
in every consent act passed for interstate compacts. See discussion in Leach, The Federal
Government and Interstate Compacts, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 421, 428 (1961).
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
20. Ibid.
21. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104 (1938).
22. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study In
Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685 (1925).
23. Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837). (Emphasis added.)
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This would seem to imply that the Constitution recognized the rights of states
to create their own compacts subject only to a review by Congress. This same
single limitation was discussed the following year with the Supreme Court
pointing out that
there can be but two tribunals under the constitution who can act on the boundaries
of states, the legislative or the judicial power; the former is limited, ill express terms,
to assent or dissent, where a compact or agreement is referred to them by the
states ... 24
and further holding that
if congress consented, then the states were in this respect restored to their original
inherent sovereignty; such consent being the sole limitation imposed by the constitution, when given, left the states as they were before....
A later case seems to offer even stronger evidence that Congress is to act as
a reviewing body only and not as a regulator or overseer of interstate compact
activity. In Virginia v. TennesseeP 3 the Court recognized that not all compacts
had to be submitted for consent. It was held that the requirement of consent
was only
directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political
power in the States, 27which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy
of the United States.

Thus, Congress apparently has only one function with respect to compacts;
to screen them before they become operative so that they do not adversely
affect the political balance of the Union. If any other function had been
intended, then submission of all interstate compacts would, no doubt, have
been required.
Admittedly the earlier cases all involved boundary disputes rather than
operational interstate agencies. In fact, it was not until after World War I
that states began using compacts to establish operational administrative
agencies.2 8 If anything, however, this should serve only to enhance appellant's
argument. The boundary settlement was the typical compact usage envisioned
by the compact clause. It had existed as a common means of solving disputes
between the colonies and the Crown, between the colonies and the Confederation
of States, and between the several colonies themselves.-"3 Thus, in all likelihood,
the compact clause was specifically designed with the boundary compact most
prominently in mind. It would seem logical, then, that the framers of the
Constitution were concerned only with initial congressional screening as a
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726 (I58). (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 725. (Emphasis added.)
14S U.S. 503 (1S93).
Id. at 519.
28. Zimmermann & Wendell, The Interstate Compact Since 1925 (1951). See also the
brief historical development in Leach, supra note 18.
24.
25.
26.
27.

29.

Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 22.
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means of preserving the national balance of power in the face of major shifts
in territorial boundaries. The fact that many years later Congress adopted the
practice of inserting a reservation of a right to alter, amend, or repeal could
not give rise to a power if it had never previously existed.
Further evidence that Congress was to be restricted to consent powers only
can be found in the Constitution itself, in the clause immediately preceding
the compact clause. 30 Like the compact clause, it too prohibited certain state
activity, e.g., imposition of import and export duties without the consent of
Congress, but here it expressly added "and all such Laws shall be subject to
the Revision and Controul of the Congress." 31 If the power of "revision and
control" was also to extend to the compact clause, the very next clause in
sequence, why then were these all-important words omitted? The most logical
answer is that the Constitution was specifically intended to restrict congressional
compact activity to the granting or withholding of consent.
Appellant would appear correct, therefore, when he asserted that the very
consent of Congress rendered the compact irrevocable, since its effect was to
remove the constitutional ban against the formation of interstate compacts,
thus restoring to the states the inherent sovereignty they enjoyed prior to the
Constitution. If this be true, then the question of pertinency of subject matter
would become academic, since the inquiry itself must fail for lack of proper
legislative purpose.
Even assuming, however, that the committee had been acting under proper
authorization and that Congress did have the right to alter, amend, or repeal
its original consent, appellee's case would still be questionable, since the contempt citation was based upon a refusal to surrender documents which had no
pertinency to the subject matter of the inquiry.
The district court referred to the subject matter as an effort "to determine
whether and to what extent Federal interests were being affected." 3 2 Could not
such inquiry be satisfied without resort to myriad memoranda representing
the thought processes and policy formulations behind the operations of the
Authority? If indeed the Port Authority is a burden on interstate commerce,
would not this become evident from objective observation of its public activities
and operations and their effects on interstate commerce, rather than from an
examination of the internal communications of staff members? There is no
question of alleged price fixing here as in the antitrust cases which requires
submission of internal corporate communications and financial books and records
as evidence of conspiracy. If factually there were no question but that a
certain activity of the Authority in no way affected, let alone hampered, inter30. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
31. In its entirety it reads "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by
any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States;
and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
32. 195 F. Supp. at 603.

1963]

CASE NrOTES

state commerce, would the adverse thinking of a staff member convert that
activity into a violation? It would hardly seem so, yet this appears to represent
the thinking of the subcommittee, extended to its logical conclusion.
The district court seemed to find sufficient pertinency in the single fact that
many Port Authority activities affect the national interest. For example, in
discussing the need for communications relating to the negotiation, execution,
and performance of construction contracts, the court said:
The explanation clearly relates the request to the subjects under inquiry: most
Authority construction projects involve facilities such as airports, bridges and tunnels,
that have an important relationship to interstate commerce and national defense.P
But this is also true of the operations of every State Highway Department,
even though their contracts and the negotiations preceding them are matters
solely of state concern. The Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress
cannot supersede the states in the control of the internal management of their
state agenciesAz - Thus, the mere presence of federal interest would not appear
to be a sufficient standard against which to measure the pertinency of specific
memoranda. A leading authority on interstate compacts has written that such
an analysis
ignores the fact that agencies established by interstate compacts are administrative
units of the states and have long been regarded as such.... Compact agencies are
legally no different than an ordinary department or agency of state government25

Double Jeopardy-Acquittal of Federal Crime Does Not Bar Subsequent
Trial in State Court for State Criminal Offense Arising out of Same
Act.-Defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York for obstructing the movement of certain merchandise in international commerce.' Before commencement of the trial in
the district court, he was also indicted in Kings County Court on four counts arising out of the same transaction as that upon which the federal indictment
was based. Upon a judgment of acquittal in the federal proceeding, the
33. Id. at 604.
34. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1933); Ashton v. Cameron County Water
Improvement Dist. No. One, 29S U.S. 513, 528 (1936); Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 337 (1935).
35. Leach, supra note 13.

1. 62 Stat. 793 (1948), 1S U.S.C. § 1951 (195S).
2. The four counts were robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree,
assault in the second degree, and kidnapping. The dissenting opinion vw concerned
only with the first three counts. See People v. Lo Cicero, 17 App. Div. 2d 31, 36, 230
N.Y.S.2d 384, 389 (2d Dep't 1962).
3. The indictment in the state court contained the added count of kidnapping. This charge

was based on evidence that in order to facilitate the disposition of the hijacked truck by an
accomplice, defendant drove the victimized driver about New York for some time before
releasing him.
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Kings County indictment was dismissed on defendant's motion. On appeal,
the appellate division reversed on the ground that the acquittal in the federal
court was not a bar to a subsequent prosecution in New York, even though the
act involved in the state prosecution was the same as that involved in the
federal prosecution. 5 People v. Lo Cicero, 17 App. Div. 2d 31, 230 N.Y.S.2d
384 (2d Dep't 1962).
Successive state prosecutions for the same offense are barred by the New
York State Constitution,6 while protection against successive federal prosecutions for the same offense is guaranteed by the double jeopardy clause of the
United States Constitution. 7 These provisions against double jeopardy, however, are inapplicable when a single act violates both state and federal criminal
laws.8 Since each sovereignty may determine what shall constitute an offense
against its peace and dignity, each may exercise its sovereign right to prescribe
punishments for what it has made an offense. 9
Although there is no constitutional bar, New York, in Section 33 of the
Penal Law, bars prosecutions where an offense has been committed in another
"state or country, or under such circumstances that the courts of this state or
government had jurisdiction thereof," and where in that "state or country"
defendant has been acquitted or convicted in a prosecution "founded upon the
act or omission ... [for] which he is upon trial [in New York]." Section 139
of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
when an act charged as a crime is within the jurisdiction of another state, territory
or country as well as within the jurisdiction of this state, a conviction or acquittal
thereof in the former, is a bar to a prosecution or indictment .. .in this state.

In People v. Mangano,' ° the appellate division applied these sections to bar
an indictment for petty larceny where the defendant had been previously tried
4. Defendant relied upon § 33 of the N.Y. Pen. Law and § 139 of the N.Y. Code of Crim.
Proc. People v. De Sisto, 27 Misc. 2d 217, 214 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Kings County Ct. 1961).
5. The court was unanimously of the opinion that with respect to the kidnapping count
not contained in the federal indictment, the motion to dismiss was erroneously granted.
However, with regard to the other three counts, two judges voted for the approval of the
dismissal. See note 2 supra.
6. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 6.
7. U.S. Const. amend. V. Note this amendment applies only to successive federal prosecutions and is inapplicable to state prosecutions. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322
(1937); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see also Hoag v. New Jersey,
356 U.S. 464, 467-68 (1958); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1947). But see
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. at 87 (dissenting opinion).
8. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959) ; United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) ; Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
13 (1852); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
9. 17 App. Div. 2d at 32, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 386. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377, 382 (1922). See note 7 supra.
10. 269 App. Div. 954, 57 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d Dep't 1945) (memorandum decision), aff'd
mem., People v. Mignogna, 296 N.Y. 1011, 73 N.E.2d 583 (1947), modifying People v.
Mignogna, 54 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Queens County Ct. 1945).
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in the federal court for the same crime. Justice Beldock, writing for the majority, distinguished Mangano on the ground that there the prosecution had conceded that the petty larceny indictment would be barred, and thus the dismissal
of the count was not before the court of appeals when it affirmed the judgment."
Whether or not Mangano actually decided the question, other New York
courts in applying sections 33 and 139 have held that a federal trial would
not bar the subsequent New York trial.'- Note, however, that these decisions
were based solely on the ground that the "same offense" was not in issue in the
prior federal trial.' 3 The instant case was the first to hold that a New York
prosecution following a federal prosecution for the same offense is not barred
on the ground that prior federal prosecutions were not intended to constitute
a defense under Section 33 of the Penal Law and Section 139 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Having resolved the case on this basis, it was unnecessary for the court to consider whether, in fact, the defendant had been
acquitted of the "same offense" in the prior federal proceeding.
The majority reasoned that the general statement of New York policy as
set forth in Section 28 of the Penal Law controlled. Section 28 provides that
an act punishable in New York "is not less so because it is also punishable
11. 17 App. Div. 2d at 34, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 337-SS.
12. People v. Adamchesky, 134 Misc. 769, 55 N.Y.S.2d 90 (CL Gen. Secs. 1945); People
v. Arnstein, 12S Iisc. 176, 213 N.Y. Supp. 633 (Ct. Gen. Sees. 1926). However, it seems
that Adamchesky would have reached a different verdict had the indictments been the mnwe
in both trials as in the instant case.
13. "A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction
and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a coniction upon one
of them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. The test is not
whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has ben
put in jeopardy for the same offense. A single act may be an offence against two statutes;
and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution
and punishment under the other." Morey v. Commonwealth, 103 Mass. (12 Browne) 433,
434 (1371). New York courts have been heavily influenced by the interpretation of the
"same offense" doctrine as set out in Commonwealth v. Roby, 29 MaEs. (12 Pich.) 496
(1832). This rule states that "itis not necessary that the charges in the two indictments
should be precisely the same; it is sufficient if an acquittal from the offense chargcd in the
first indictment virtually includes an acquittal from that set forth in the second, however
they may differ in degree." Id. at 504. People v. Spitzer, 143 Misc. 97, 26f N.Y. Supp, 522
(Sup. Ct. 1933) and People v. Parker, 175 Misc. 776, 25 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Kings County Ct.
1941) both involved decisions concerning the application of § 139 of the N.Y. Cede of Crim.
Proc. and § 33 of the N.Y. Pen. Law. These cases found that as betvecn a conspiracy and the
substantive crime, trial of one would bar trial of the other under the "same offense" doctrine. It is submitted that if this were so then the courts would be giving more weight to
the federal decisions than to the decisions of our own New York courts, since in New Yorh
the substantive crime has clearly been distinguished from the conspiracy. See People v.
Tavormina, 257 N.Y. 34, 177 N.E. 317 (1931); People v. Taft, 174 Misc. 1033, 22 N.Y.S2d
434 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See also People ex rel. Hart v. Truesdell, 2M0 App. Div. 2-4, 22
N.Y.S.2d 325 (2d Dep't 1940) (memorandum decision).
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under the laws of another state, government or country, unless the contrary is
expressly declared. . .

."

Such contrary declaration might have been found

either in Section 33 of the Penal Law or in Section 139 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. But, since only New York prosecutions following prosecutions by
"another state, territory or country" in section 139 and "another state or
country" in section 33 were barred by those sections, the court reasoned that
prior federal prosecutions for the same offense were governed by the general
rule of section 28, rather than the exceptions stated in sections 33 and 139.14
The majority reasoned that the absence of the word "government" from
sections 33 and 139 was not a legislative oversight but the manifestation of a
legislative intention to exclude prior federal proceedings from the statutory bar
to subsequent New York prosecutions.'r
The court distinguished People ex rel. Liss v. Superintendent of Women's
Prison16 on the ground that there a prosecution for a violation of Public Health
Law Section 44517 was expressly barred where there had been a previous prosecution under the federal narcotics laws. The prior federal proceeding was
a bar in Liss only because of the peculiar statute (which expressly declared
a prior federal trial to be a bar) involved there.' 8
The majority also dismissed defendant's argument based upon collateral estoppel. This doctrine bars subsequent litigation of questions actually or necessarily litigated in a prior action. 19 If, for example, the former acquittal was clearly
based on the defendant's absence from the scene of the crime, such a determination would be foreclosed from question in a subsequent prosecution."0
But when it is impossible to determine on what ground an acquittal was based,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not bar a subsequent trial for a crime,
the elements of which may have been similar or identical to the first offense. " '
Before the doctrine may be applied, it must be shown that an issue "has
been in fact litigated and necessarily adjudicated in a prior criminal case ..
14.

17 App. Div. 2d at 33, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87.
15. The basis of this reasoning was the fact that the original draft of the Field Commission of 1864 contained the word "government." However, when finally enacted "government" was omitted, indicating to the majority an intent to exclude federal government
prosecutions from the provisions of the present § 139 of the N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. 17
App. Div. 2d at 33-34, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 387.

16. 282 N.Y. 115, 25 N.E.2d 869 (1940), reversing 257 App. Div. 865, 13 N.Y.S.2d 787
(2d Dep't 1939) (memorandum decision).
17. Now N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3354(3).
18. 17 App. Div. 2d at 34, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
19. See 2 Freeman, Judgments § 648 (5th ed. 1925); Restatement, Judgments § 68
(1942).

20. See Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941) ; People v. Grzesczak, 77 Misc.
202, 137 N.Y. Supp. 538 (Nassau County Ct. 1912); cf. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S.
575 (1948).
21. See, e.g., State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940) ; People v. Rodgers, 184
App. Div. 461, 171 N.Y. Supp. 451 (1st Dep't 1918), aff'd mem., 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E.
882 (1919).
22. 17 App. Div. 2d at 35, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
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between the identical parties. Although the doctrine would not be applicable in
the instant case because the prosecuting party in the former trial was the
United States while in the second proceeding it was the People of New York,
the majority found the doctrine inapplicable for the further reason that defendant had not shown whether the issue of identity had been resolved in his
favor because there was insufficient proof
of identity in the previous trial or
23
merely because of an erroneous charge.
In his dissent, Justice Christ reasoned that the holding in iTss-wben
considered in conjunction with sections 33 and 139-dictated a more liberal result in the instant case. He found the result reached by the majority to undermine the traditional
aversion to double jeopardy expressed by the New York
24legislature.
No difference in reason is pointed out as to why a trial in a foreign country or a
sister State should be given greater effect, as to double jeopardy, than one in a United

States court 2

The dissent's reasoning would appear to have the stronger support in prior
New York decisions dealing with prior federal prosecutions. Certainly sections
33 and 139 have never before been held inapplicable to prior prosecutions
for the reason that they were JederalU0 On the contrary, all previous New Yorl:
decisions implied that a prior federal prosecution would constitute a bar under
these sections so long as proof of the "same offense" was given.2 7
In the absence of any explicit declaration by the court of appeals concerning
the applicability of sections 33 and 139 to prior federal trials, the question of
their applicability will remain uncertain. Since, in the past, New York decisions
have impliedy rejected the reasoning of the instant case,2 3 it is uncertain
whether the rationale of the majority will be accepted in the future. Even
if the majority correctly determined that the intention of the legislature was to
exclude prior federal prosecutions from the statutory bar, the court's reasoning
is quite questionable. The mere absence of the word "government" might, for
example, be attributed to any number of reasons including the "streamlining"
of the bill as it appeared in the draft of the Field Commission of 1864.Certainly, it is doubtful whether the legislature intended to make an exception
for the arbitrary reason that a prior conviction or acquittal was fedcral.
If, as the majority reasoned, the legislature intentionally excluded federal
proceedings as a bar to subsequent New York indictments, such an omission
could logically have its basis only in the consideration that there is an inherent
difference between federal crimes and local crimes-the difference between state
23. Id. at 35, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 3SS-S9. Defendant would have the burden of shoring
the issues decided in the federal court. He should have introduced the record of that trial.
24.

Id. at 37, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 390 (dissenting opinion).

25. Id. at 36, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 390 (dissenting opinion).
26. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.
29.

See note 15 supra.
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and federal sovereignties. Such an inherent difference between state and
federal penal provisions might perhaps be based upon the broad distinction
between all federal legislation and state legislation-that the former must be
predicated upon specific constitutional grant or purpose, while the latter is
independent of specific grants. The Constitution serves not to vest but rather
to limit state legislative power. Despite the diversity in purpose or source of
authority for the enactment, however, federal and state penal laws do overlap
in many areas. Absent any express statement of policy restricting the extent
of sections 33 or 139, it is submitted that they should be liberally construed
to bar New York prosecutions where there has been a prior prosecution by the
federal government. Since these sections are designed to supplement the double
jeopardy protection guaranteed by the New York State Constitution, they should
not be arbitrarily restricted because of the distinction between the nature and
purpose of federal legislation vis-A-vis that of state legislation.

Labor-Federal Courts Lack Jurisdiction To Grant Specific Performance
of Agreement Not To Strike-Petitioner, employer, sought, pursuant to
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,' to enjoin the defendant union and its
officers from further breaching the no-strike clause contained in their collective
bargaining agreement. 2 The petition alleged that the union, on nine occasions,
had engaged in work stoppages and strikes in violation of this contract. The
union moved for dismissal on the ground that injunctive relief in a labor dispute
was barred by Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act.8 The union's motion
was granted 4 and this determination was subsequently affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 5 On certiorari, the Supreme Court held
that there was nothing in the language or legislative history of Section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act which repealed the Norris-La Guardia Act so as to
authorize federal courts to enjoin strikes which constitute a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act specifically denied federal courts
jurisdiction to enjoin strikes precipitated by a labor dispute.0 The subsequently
1. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)

(1958).
2. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). The union had agreed that there
should be "'no strikes or work stoppages
for any cause which is or may be the subject
of a grievance.'" 370 U.S. at 197.
3.

47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).

4. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 187 F. Supp. 225 (N.I). Ind. 1960).
5. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961).
6. Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act provides that: "No court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute . . . (a) Ceasing or
refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment. . . " 47 Stat.
70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958). Section 13(c) of the act defines a "labor dispute" In
the following broad language: "[Any controversy concerning terms or conditions of em-
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enacted Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, gave federal courts
jurisdiction to entertain suits between employers and unions for violations of
collective bargaining ageements. 7 The obvious overlap of these two statutes,
when a promise not to strike is made part of a labor contract, has created a
problem of interpretation for courts.
Although in the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act certain minor inroads were
made upon the broad interdict of section 4,8 it is clear that Congress e.\pressly
rejected a proposed direct repeal of its application to collective bargaining.9
Adhering to this legislative history, the majority of federal courts have refused
to find in section 301 an avenue for specific performance of no-strike clauses.10
Doubt was cast on the propriety of such decisions, however, by two opinions
of the Supreme Court. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 1 in affirming

a lower court decree forcing a reluctant employer to arbitrate, the Court said
it saw "no justification in policy for restricting § 301(a) to damage suits,
leaving specific performance of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes
ployment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fining,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardls of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958). The only exception to the broad prohibition
of § 4 is found in § 7. Nevertheless, § 7 only requires the federal courts to issue injunctions
in violent labor disputes. 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
7. Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act reads as follows: "Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce... may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the dtizenship of the parties." 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 US.C. § 185(a) (1958).
S. Sections 10(h) and 20S(b) authorize injunctions to be obtained at the suit of the
National Labor Relations Board and the Attorney General respectively. 61 Stat. 149, 155
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(h), 178(b) (1953). Furthermore, only § 302(c), dealing with the
responsibilities of union representatives, expressly allows an injunctive remedy in favor of
a private litigant 61 Stat. 15S (1947), 29 US.C. § 1M6(e) (195S).
9. The legislative history of § 301 reveals that both houses agreed initially to allow
federal courts to enjoin breaches of collective bargaining agreements. The Home bill provided that the anti-injunctive laws "shall not have any application in rezpect of either
party .. P" to such agreements. H.R. 3020, SOth Cong., Ist Sess. § 8(b)(5) (1947). Both
these provisions, however, were stricken in joint conference, with the epithet that these
suits "be left to the usual processes of the law" and not to the National Labor Relations
Board. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947).
10. A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 932 (1953); W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6
(1st Cir. 1954); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, S1 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), afild per
curiam, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 33S U.S. 821 (1949). But see Teamsters
Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 232 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), revd per
curiam, 370 U.. 711 (1962); Johnson & Johnson v. Textile Wor:ers Union, 184 F. Supp.
359 (D.N.J. 1960); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union Local
25, 175 F. Supp. 750 (WD. Wash. 1959).
11. 353 US. 443 (1957).
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to the . .. [Norris-La Guardia] Act."'12 It viewed the enforcement of the
employer's agreement to arbitrate as the quid pro quo for labor's no-strike
agreement.' 3 In so deciding, the Court necessarily relegated Section 7 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act to a position inferior to section 301. In the second case,
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. Rd?.,14 interpreting
the Railway Labor Act which provides for compulsory arbitration of minor
disputes,'3 the Court held that section 4 did not bar the enjoining of a strike
caused by such a dispute. It reasoned that to decide otherwise, would be to
effectively deprive the arbitrator of his congressionally intended jurisdiction,' 0
and thus, to preserve the obvious purpose of both acts, it was the Court's duty
7
to seek an accommodation between the two.'

Reading these two cases as an indication of the Supreme Court's willingness
to adopt the concept of accommodation to section 301 suits, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines,
Inc.,'8 declared that in cases involving agreements not to strike, the antiinjunctive law had been impliedly repealed. The court argued that the
guarantee of congressional intent demanded that a distinction be made between
the utilization of an injunctive decree for the negative purpose of subverting
union activities from that of affiirmatively preserving a contract freely
negotiated by the parties.' 9 It is to be noted that in arriving at its conclusion
the court ignored not only the legislative history of section 301, but also refused
to follow two apposite holdings by the Courts of Appeals for the First and
20
Second Circuits.
12. Id. at 458.
13. Id. at 455.
14. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
15. The Railway Labor Act authorizes either side to submit a "minor dispute" to tie
Adjustment Board whose awards "shall be final and binding upon both parties to the
dispute. . . " 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1958).
16. 353 U.S. at 39. However, the Norris-La Guardia Act has been held to prohibit the
issuance of an injunction in a railway labor case involving "major disputes." Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944). It should be noted that
the responsibility of "major disputes" is entrusted to the National Mediation Board, whose
power in these disputes is limited to mediation. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
17. 353 U.S. at 40. Similarly, -there is much the same conflict between the blanket
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act and § 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act. However, an injunction is not available under Chicago River unless one of the parties
has submitted the dispute to the Adjustment Board. Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry.,
353 U.S. 927 (1957) (per curiam).
18. 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam, 370 U.S. 711 (1962).
19. 282 F.2d at 349-50. In addition, this court interpreted Lincoln Mills as conferring on
the federal courts a very broad jurisdiction in suits brought under § 301-one that embraced an injunctive remedy for breach of a no-strike clause in a labor dispute. 282 F.2d
at 349.
20. These two courts denied specific performance of a no-strike clause on the ground
that § 301 did not repeal by implication the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
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In the instant case, the Court completely rejected the result reached in
Teamsters despite the fact that the Justices would appear to be sympathetic
towards the underlying policy of the decision, i.e., to deprive the employer
of an injunction is to weaken substantially his bargaining power and thereby
frustrate the national labor policy designed to foster peaceful bilateral negotiation. 21 The Court, however, felt section 301's history was so overpowering that
any other decision would be a serious infringement upon the legislative prerogative and, therefore, this was not a proper area for judicial inventiveness. The accommodation found in Chicago River, the majority argued, could not be
extended to the present situation, since there the union by striking was disregarding an affirmative statutory duty to arbitrate which supplied a reasonable
substitute for the protection afforded by section 4 .2- 3 Lincoln Mills, the Court
continued, by granting a mandatory injunction to arbitrate did not preclude
the type of activity the Norris-La Guardia Act was specifically designed to safeguard, i.e., strikes or work stoppages,- 4 and thus could not be considered
precedent for the type of relief sought by petitioner.
The dissent in the case at bar readily admitted the correctness of the
majority's view that section 301 did not repeal section 4 but proffered the
solution that the language and the legislative history of section 301 are at best
ambiguous and just as easily lend themselves to judicial accommodation as not.Mr. Justice Brennan saw in the instant situation the same nexus between the
anti-injunctive law and its substitute as that which prompted the decision in
Chicago River, particularly since the union freely assented to settlement by
26
arbitration.
The dissent raised another problem which is compounded by the majority's
La Guardia Act. See A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.
1957); W1.L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954).
21. "[Wihatever might be said about the merits of this argument, [that injunctions
against peaceful strikes are necessary to make the arbitration process effective] Con.re3
has rejected it. In doing so, it set the limit to which it was willing to go in permitting
courts to effectuate the congressional policy favoring arbitration and it is not this Court's
business to review the wisdom of that decision." 370 U.S. at 213.
22. Id. at 214-15.
23. 370 U.S. at 211.
24. See 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 102, 104 (1953).
25. The dissent compares the legislative history of § 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act with
that of § 301. Section 303 initially provided for injunctive relief in suits resulting from
certain concerted employee activities. As a result of opposition, the section, as finally enacted,
provided for damages only. The dissent argues that Congress was content to rely upon
the courts to resolve conflicts between § 301 and § 4, otherwise, "Congress would have
used language confining § 301 to damage remedies . . . if such had been the intention."
370 U.S. at 223.
26. 370 U.S. at 219 (dissenting opinion). See Cox, Current Problems in the Law of
Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Alt. L. Rev. 247, 255 (195S). See also Gregory, The Law
of the Collective Agreement, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 635, 645-46 (1959); Rice, A Paradox of Our
National Labor Law, 34 Alarq. L. Rev. 233, 235-37 (1951); Stewart, No-Strike Clauses
in the Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 673, 6S3 (1961).
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decision, that is, its effect upon state court remedies. The Supreme Court, in
Lincoln Mills, interpreted section 301 as not only conferring jurisdiction on
the federal courts in the field of collective bargaining2 7 but also as creating a
federal substantive law in this area.2 8 In the leading state decision on the
subject, McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters,2 0 the
court recognized that state law had been pre-empted by federal, but in
asserting a literal reading of Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act,30 It
concluded that the statute did not deprive state courts of their discretionary
power to give specific performance of contracts not to strike. Mr. Justice
Brennan noted that the logical result of such a situation is to make state
courts the favored tribunal for the aggrieved employer, thereby defeating the
Lincoln Mills' goal of uniformity in settling labor disputes.A1 Of course, the
entire dilemma might be obviated by the union's right to have the action
removed to a federal court.32 However, there is some doubt whether this
escape exists where the original petition merely seeks to enjoin a strike.8
Perhaps an even more significant issue left unresolved by the present case
is the jurisdiction of a district court to enforce an injunction ordered pursuant
to a properly invoked arbitration proceeding. Notwithstanding New York's "little
Norris-La Guardia Act," 3 4 it was held in Ruppert v. Egelhlfer,8 that for the
27. See note 7 supra.
28. The Court in Lincoln Mills declared that "substantive law to apply in suits under
§ 301(a) is federal law. . . . [And] federal interpretation of the federal law will govern,
not state law. . . .but state law if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted
to ... ." 353 U.S. at 456-57. Although the language in Lincoln Mills is merely suggestive, tile
courts have concluded on the basis of this language that federal jurisdiction was not
intended to be exclusive. Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 870 (SD.N.Y.
1959); McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315
P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). See Meltzer, The Supreme Court,
Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: II, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 280
(1959).
29. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
30. "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . injunction
... involving .. . any labor dispute. . . ." 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
31. 370 U.S. at 226 (dissenting opinion).
32. "[Any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts . . . have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the
United States. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
33. "The commentators are not uniform on whether a case can be removed from a
state court which has jurisdiction. Castle & Cooke Terminals, Ltd. v. Local 137, ILU, 110
F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Hawaii 1953) suggests that no right of removal to the federal courts
would exist. See also, In re INS, King Features, 41 LRRM 2639, holding that an employer's
proceeding to vacate an arbitration award in favor of a union is not removable by tile
union to the federal district court under the federal removal statute." Kramer, Arbitration
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 N.Y.U. Conference on Labor 255, 266 n.4 (1958). See also
National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Home Bldg.
Corp. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 53 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Mo. 1943).
34. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 876(a).
35. 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
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state court to stand behind such an award was permissible, even conceding the
fact that it could not, on its own initiative, accomplish the same endS0 It is
impossible to speculate what the outcome would be if the Supreme Court were
faced with the identical circumstance. If Ruppcrt were followed, it would undoubtedly put "the federal courts back into the business of enjoining
strikes ... ', an eventuality to which the Court appears totally opposed.
Although apparently sound, the decision in the instant case serves merely to
close one avenue of approach. To achieve the desired result of an enforceable
no-strike clause, the employer may possibly, as McCarroll teaches, proceed in
a favorable state forum if circumstances allow. As an alternative, however,
at the outset, he may include such a clause in a valid contract to arbitrate,
and upon a favorable arbitration determination move to confirm in the state
court 3 s

Negligence-State Held Not Liable for Suicide of Sane Prisoner in Custody.--Decedent was arrested for the murder of his wife and while in custody
he jumped from a second story window, fracturing his ankle. He was ordered
committed to a state hospital for a determination of his mental capacity to stand
trial. The sheriff notified the hospital authorities that he and the district attorney
felt that the prisoner had suicidal tendencies and for this reason offered to post
a constant guard over him. After the offer was declined by the hospital with the
explanation that its staff was capable of adequate supervision, decedent strangled himself in his hospital room with an "ace" bandage which had been placed
on his ankle by order of a staff doctor. Decedent's administrator brought suit
against the state for negligence. At the trial, a report of two psychiatrists was
introduced which concluded that decedent had been mentally capable of
understanding the charges against him and of defending himself in court. A
third psychiatrist testified that decedent was sane when examined. The court
of claims found for the plaintiff but the appellate division reversed, holding
that the decedent was sane and, therefore, the state was not liable for his
suicide. Gioia v. State, 16 App. Div. 2d 354, 228 N.Y.S.2d 127 (4th Dep't 1962).
In addition to the question of the state's liability for the suicide, the court
considered the measure of damages which would have been applied had the
alleged negligence been proved. On this issue it concluded, without recourse
to authority, that a post-mortem inquiry into decedent's guilt or innocence
36. Furthermore, the court declared that "arbitration is voluntary and there is no
reason why unions and employers should deny such powers to the special tribunals they
themselves create." Id. at 582, 143 N.E.2d at 131, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 7S3. This deciion,
however, was based on the language of the contract providing for speedy arbitration.

Nlotwithstanding the fact that the contract did not expressly give the arbitrator the power
to grant injunctive relief, the court concluded such power was inferred; otherwise, the

purpose of the contract could never be achieved.
37. 370 U.S. at 214.
33. See, e.g., Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 14S N.E2d 129, 170 X.YS2d 785

(195s).
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of the murder charge would be too speculative in determining his life expectancy and the loss of future earnings.'
Concerning the damages recoverable for wrongful death, the New York
Decedent Estate Law provides:
The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such a sum as the . . . court . . .
deems to be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries, resulting from
the decedent's death, to the person or persons, for whose benefit the action is brought. 2
The apportioning of damages for wrongful death involves a good deal of
speculation in any case. The problem presented in the instant situation has
never arisen previously and in formulating the law applicable to the point
in issue the appellate division merely applied common sense. The very idea
of trying to determine in a civil suit the criminal culpability of a decedent goes
beyond the bounds of plausibility.
The exact limits of judicial speculation concerning the value of a life cannot
be specifically determined. When the decedent is insane at the time of death,
the courts will inquire into the possibility of recovery in calculating the
economic value of the lost life and will attempt to fix a speculative value on
such life accordingly. 3 Conversely, it has been held that where the decedent
was hopelessly insane no pecuniary value could be put on his life. 4 However,
as stated in the instant case, to go beyond this standard would be to destroy the
principles of certainty in the law of damages.
In reaching its decision that the state could not be held liable for the death
of decedent, the present court noted that in all cases allowing recovery in
similar circumstances the decedent was insane and, therefore, his death was
the result of a nonvolitional act.5 Hence, the appellate division reiterated the
principle that insanity cannot be presumed from the mere fact of suicide. Based
on the testimony of decedent's psychiatrist, it was concluded that the act in
question was that of a sane man; a calculated effort to escape punishment
for his crime. The court thereby reasoned that the circumstances were the
same as if decedent had hanged himself in an ordinary jail. The decision
hinged on the question of decedent's mental state and, since he was found sane,
recovery was denied according to the principle volenti non fit injuria.0
1. Gioia v. State, 16 App. Div. 2d 354, 356, 228 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130 (4th Dep't 1962)
(dictum).
2. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 132.
3. Dow v. State, 183 Misc. 674, 50 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Ct. Cl. 1944) ; Spataro v. State, 166
Misc. 418, 3 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Ct. C. 1937).
4. St. Pierre v. State, 272 App. Div. 973, 71 N.Y.S.2d 608 (3d Dep't 1947); Slater v.
State, 192 Misc. 826, 82 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
5. In support of this proposition the court cited Hirsh v. State, 8 N.Y.2d 125, 168
N.E.2d 372, 202 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1960). However, in that case the question at issue was
the reasonable care of the state authorities. In the instant case, the inadequate surveillance
of the staff was admitted by the court. 16 App. Div. 2d at 356, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
Moreover, in Hirsh no particular importance was attached to the mental condition of
the decedent.
6. 16 App. Div. 2d at 357-58, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 131-32.
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On the other hand, in dissenting, Presiding Justice Williams found ample
evidence of decedent's suicidal tendencies which should have put the hospital
authorities on notice. Thus, Justice Williams seemed to base the liability of the
state not so much on decedent's
general mental condition, but on the fore7
seeability of his suicide.
With regard to the presumption of sanity, it is an accepted rule that every
man is presumed sane until that presumption is overthrown by clear and satisfactory proof. s Furthermore, it has been held in New York that the mere fact
of suicide will not rebut the presumption of sanity since "'experience has shown
that self-destruction is often perpetrated by the sane.' " However, this view
does not seem to be universal, as evidenced by a holding of the United States
Supreme Court, that "in making out . . . [his] proof, the plaintiff is entitled
to the benefit of the presumption that a sane man would not commit suicide. . . ."10 Between these extremes is the position of Dean Wigmore, who
states that "no single act can be of itself decisive; while, on the other hand,
any act whatever may be significant to some extent."" Thus:
Suicide is generally conceded to be a circumstances [sic] from which (wth others)
insanity may be inferred . . . but it ought not to create a presumption or shift
the duty of producing evidence, though the judicial language is here sometimes
ambiguous.'This would seem to be a proper statement
of the law, and one which is not
3
incompatible with the New York view.'
In the principal case, the court adopted a negative attitude on this point.
Despite the fact that the suicide of the decedent raises no presumption, is it
then within the spirit of the applicable law to pass over it? It would seem
that a proper view would be to consider the suicide as a factor tending towards
a determination of insanity even though inconclusive in itself. In this way the
entire behavior pattern of the decedent might have been considered and a more
accurate conclusion reached.
As previously indicated, the majority in the instant case based its decision
upon the question of decedent's sanity and equated his position to that of a
7. Id. at 361, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 134 (dissenting opinion).
8. Banker v. Banker, 63 N.Y. 409 (1875); Meekins v. Kinsella, 152 App. Div. 32,
136 N.Y. Supp. S06 (1st Dep't 1912); Angelo v. Angelo, 23 Misc. 2d 1018, 220 N.Y.S.2d
744 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
9. Weed v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 70 N.Y. 561, 564 (1377). Accord, In re
Levine's Estate, 193 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
10. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 US. 463, 475 (1S93).
11. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 228, at 9 (3d ed. 1940).
12. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2500(c), at 359 (3d ed. 1940).
13. See Roche V. Nason, 185 N.Y. 123, 77 N.E. 1007 (1905) where the court stated:

"Mental derangement cannot be predicated solely upon the circumstance that he hilled
himself. Insanity is not inferable from the mere act of suicide, . . . Nor does the fact
that a man has taken his own life, alone and of itself and in the absence of any other
evidence as to his mental condition, warrant the deduction that his mind was unsound at
the time of the suicidal act.

.

.

."

Id. at 137, 77 N.E. at 1009.
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prisoner in any jail.' However, every prisoner in jail is not sent to a mental
hospital for observation. The New York Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that a court may order a sanity examination for a defendant "if . .. there
is reasonable ground for believing that such defendant is in such state of ...
insanity that he is incapable of understanding the charge . .. or of making his
defense. . . ."15 Furthermore, with respect to such action a New York court
has stated:
[It] should not be instituted impulsively, and only after due deliberation and
consideration, when the court has adequate reason to believe that a defendant is in
such a state of mind, etc., is there justification for making an order instituting such
a procedure. 16
Thus it can be seen that under the New York penal system a defendant is
not sent for observation without good reason to believe that he is in some way
mentally unbalanced.
Concerning the question of an institution's liability for the suicide of a patient
the general rule is that a hospital must exercise such due care as the patient's
known mental condition requires. 17 It has been held that the most important
single factor in determining liability is whether the hospital authorities could
have anticipated under the circumstances that the patient might harm himself.
A hospital is under a duty to protect its inmates from the known or reasonably
ascertainable danger of suicide. Thus it would seem that the governing circumstance is the foreseeability of the act of the inmate.18 In the cases granting
recovery, the suicide could reasonably have been anticipated. 10 On the other
hand, where there was no warning as to the propensities
of the decedent, the
20
state or the hospital has been absolved from liability.
In one case, the decedent hanged himself while still in the admission ward
of a mental institution. While finding that the decedent was mentally disturbed,
the court held for the state since there was no indication of suicidal tendencies
and the authorities had not had a reasonable time within which to examine
14. 16 App. Div. 2d at 357, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
15. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 658. (Emphasis added.)
16. People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 331, 15 N.Y.S.2d 215, 224 (N.Y. County Ct.
1939).
17. See Daley v. State, 273 App. Div. 552, 78 N.Y.S.2d 584 (3d Dep't 1948), aff'd
mem., 298 N.Y. 880, 84 N.E.2d 801 (1949).
18. See Dimitroff v. State, 171 Misc. 635, 13 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Ct. Cl. 1939). For an
enlightening discussion of the application of the doctrine of foresecability to hospital
suicide cases, see Perr, Suicide Responsibility of Hospital and Psychiatrist, 9 Clev.-Mar.
L. Rev. 427 (1960).
19. E.g., Martindale v. State, 269 N.Y. 554, 199 N.E. 667 (1935); Wilson v. State,
14 App. Div. 2d 976, 221 N.Y.S.2d 354 (3d Dep't 1961) (memorandum decision); Daley v.
State, supra note 17; Dow v. State, supra note 3; Dimitroff v. State, supra note 18.
20. E.g., Estate of Maury v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 1007, 183 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Ct. CI. 1959);
Lewis v. State, 1 Misc. 2d 1078, 152 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Fowler v. State, 192
Misc. 15, 78 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Ct. CI. 1948); Brigante v. State, 33 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Ct. CI. 1942).
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the patient. 1 On a similar theory, the state was absolved from liability for
the suicide of a manic depressive who had attempted suicide in the past. The
court reasoned that since the decedent had been improving prior to the incident,
it was not foreseeable that he would take his own life.2 An interesting situation
arose in a case where a mother with no history of mental irregularity, while
in an advanced state of pregnancy, suffered a sudden attack of intrapartum
psychosis and leaped from a hospital window to her death. The court of appeals
found for her estate, holding that the issue was a question of reasonable care
for the jury to decide. 3 judge Desmond, in a dissent in which Judge Fuld
concurred, reasoned that the defendant hospital should not be held liable for
this one-in-a-million occurrence, since it was totally unforeseeable.24
The doctrine of foreseeability seems to have application in other states.p
This concept was asserted most firmly in an early Missouri decision.20 There,
the court held that the plaintiff did not have to prove decedent's insanity
before he could recover. It stated that defendant's awareness of decedents
suicidal tendencies was all-important and that the test to determine liability
27
is the foreseeability of suicide regardless of sanity.
Thus it appears that the determining factor of liability should be the foreseeability of the suicide rather than the mere question of decedent's sanity.
In the principal case, the court overlooked this factor, especially in view of the
notice which the hospital had from the sheriff.
In determining the sanity of the decedent, the majority of the instant court
laid great stress on the testimony of the psychiatrist who examined him2 s
However, nowhere in the report of this testimony was there any reference to
the "suicidal tendencies" of the decedent or his lack thereof which, as we have
seen, should be the determinative factor in ascertaining whether the institution
is liable.
The appellate division was not impressed by decedent's hospital records and
death certificate since no evidence was introduced "to show that these conclusory statements were based upon the knowledge of any factual circumstances
21.

Lewis v. State, supra note 20.

22. Fowler v. State, supra note 20.
23. Santos v. Unity Hosp., 301 N.Y. 153, 93 N.E.2d 574 (1950).
24. Id. at 156, 93 N.E.2d at 576. Conversely, in the d;ent in the Hirsh case, supra
note 5, at 12S, 16S N.E.2d at 373, 202 N.YS.2d at 29S, Judge Froessel, in arguing for
recovery for the death of decedent, placed great weight on the forezeeability of the suidde
because of the previous attempts of the decedent. However, the majority in that case denied
recovery on entirely different grounds. See note 5 supra.
25. See, e.g., StaIlman v. Robinson, 364 Mo. 275, 260 S.W.2d 743 (1953); Mesedahl v.
St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 194 Minn. 19S, 259 N.W. 819 (1935).
26. Smith v. Simpson, 221 Mo. App. 550, 2S S.W. 69 (1926).
27. Id. at 556-57, 2SS S.W. at 72. Concerning the state's re ponsibility for patients
in its mental institutions, a New York court has stated: 'tProgresAve government accepts
the responsibilities that the modem democratic State owes to the individuals in its society.
It is now well established that the wards of the Empire State must have adequate care
and supervision." Dow v. State, supra note 3, at 675, 50 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
2S. 16 App. Div. 2d at 360, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
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supporting the conclusion."
On the other hand, the dissent placed great
weight on these records, especially the death certificate which gave the cause
of death as strangulation "while temporarily insane." In so doing, Justice
Williams pointed out that such certificate is presumptive evidence of the facts
alleged therein. 30 He therefore concluded that these records constituted ample
basis for the decision of the court of claims. 31
On the issue of the weight which should be given to the death certificate of
a decedent, the New York Civil Practice Act provides:
Where a public officer is required or authorized . . . to make a certificate or an
affidavit . . . to a fact ascertained by him, in the course of his official duty . . .
the certificate or affidavit . . . is presumptive evidence of the facts therein
alleged .... 32
In the same spirit, the New York Public Health Law provides:
Any copy of the record of a ... death . . . shall be prima fade evidence of the facts
therein stated in all courts ... and in all actions, proceedings ... or otherwise .... 03
Moreover, such a certificate has been held to be presumptive evidence that
one decedent died by suicide34 and another from poison.3, In one wrongful
death action the court stated that the fact that the death certificate gave a
cause of death which did not controvert the contention of the plaintiff, would
place upon the defendant the necessity of coming forward with evidence that
the decedent did not die in a manner claimed by the plaintiff.30
Granted that these cases all concern the single fact of cause of death, yet
the analogy to the principal case can be seen. Furthermore, the words of the
statutes are all-inclusive, embracing every fact stated in the certificate.3 7
Therefore, due to the existence of this presumption and the fact that in
wrongful death actions the burden of proof as to the contributory fault of
the decedent is upon the defendant,3 8 it is submitted that the evidence in the
principal case was sufficient to have justified the appellate division in upholding
the decision of the court of claims.
Trade Regulation-Robinson-Patman Act-Defense of Meeting Competition Available to Seller Charged With Price Discrimination Although
Seller Obtained New Customers.-Petitioner, Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., sought
29.

Ibid.

30. In support of this proposition justice Williams cited the following: N.Y. Ctv. Prac.
Act § 367; N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4103; Brownrigg v. Boston & Albany R.R., 8 App.
Div. 2d 140, 141, 185 N.YS.2d 977, 979 (1st Dep't 1959) (per curiam).
31. 16 App. Div. 2d at 361, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
32. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 367. (Emphasis added.)
33. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4103. (Emphasis added.)
34. Scott v. Empire State Degree of Honor, 204 App. Div. 530, 198 N.Y. Supp. 535
(4th Dep't 1923).
35. Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940).
36. Brownrigg v. Boston & Albany R.R., supra note 30.
37. See notes 32 & 33 supra and accompanying text.
38. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 131.
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to set aside a cease and desist order of the Federal Trade Commissionl charging
it with discriminating in price among its customers in violation of Section 2 (a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act.2 The Commission's order resulted from Sunshine's granting to certain large grocery and drug chains in Cleveland, Ohio,
volume and cash discounts which were not offered to their competitors. Petitioner admitted a prima facie price violation, but asserted the statutory defense
that its lower price was made in good faith to meet a competitor's price3a The
Commission specifically objected to "a number of instances . . . [where
Sunshine] offered discounts matching those granted by competitors to their
customers and was thus able to obtain new customcrs. 5 With one member
dissenting, it decided that the defense was limited to situations where discounts

are granted defensively to retain old customers, and did not include instances
in which new customers are attracted by aggressive price reductions. On
review, the court of appeals set aside the Commission's order and held that the
"gaining of new customers" test would be practically unworkable and would
stifle competition for new customers, thus fostering monopoly and defeating
the purpose of the act. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.
1962).5

Congress' main concern in drafting the original Section 2 of the Clayton Act0
was with predatory practices of industrial giants whose selective price reductions were too often effective in eliminating smaller competitorsY The

competition sought to be protected was that between rival sellers, i.e., primary
1. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U 15469 (FTC Orders) (1961).
2. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958) (Supp. MI, 1959-1961).
3. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1961).
4. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 15469, at 20344-45 (FTC Orders) (1961).
(Emphasis added.)
5. The Federal Trade Commission, on Nov. 23, 1962, issued a statement explaining
its reasons for not seeking Supreme Court review of the Seventh Circuit's decision in the
instant case. The Commission emphasized that its decision not to seek Supreme Court
review does not reflect a change of position by the Commission on the question of law
involved. Since the court of appeals based its decision on statutory interpretation, without
reaching the factual question of whether the purchasers granted the lower prices were old
customers or new customers of Sunshine Biscuits, the Commission believed review of the
case would not be appropriate. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. T 50166 (Comment-CCH Analysis)
(Nov. 23, 1962). The Commission's determination leaves unresolved the conflict of decisions
between the Second and Seventh Circuits. See Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265
F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 326 (1959); and notes 23 & 29 infra and accompanying text.
6. 3S Stat. 730 (1914).
7. Section 2 of the Clayton Act was designed to deal with the "common practice of
great and powerful combinations . . . to lower prices of their commodities, oftentimes
below the cost of production in certain communities and sections where they had competition, with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their competitors, and with the ultimate purpose in view of thereby acquiring a monopoly in the
particular locality or section in which the discriminating price is made." H.R. Rep. No. 627,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
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line competition. The Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act 8

were designed to meet economic problems of a different nature; more particularly, those resulting from the growth of chain stores and the anticompetitive
effects of their often coercive buying power. 9 In this latter instance, the competition affected was that among competing buyers, i.e., secondary line competitionthe situation in the instant case.
The present section 2 (a) provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person...
to discriminate in price between different purchasers ...

where the effect ...

may

be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure

.

. . competition.

.

.

."0

Although counsel

supporting a section 2(a) complaint must establish both discrimination in
price and the requisite competitive effect, this burden amounts to no more than
demonstrating a price differential" and a reasonable possibility of injury
to competition. 12 In a primary line case, the burden of proving possible injury
often entails extensive market surveys, 3 whereas a secondary line injury is
suggested by the mere fact of a price difference among competing customers.' 4
Once confronted with a prima facie violation, the act provides that a seller
may "justify" his otherwise illegal price discrimination by proving any of three
statutory defenses,' 5 one of which is that the discrimination "was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. .

. ."16

These "justifications"

8. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
9. "This bill is designed to accomplish what so far the Clayton Act has only weakly
attempted, namely, to protect the independent merchant . . . from exploitation by his

chain competitor." 79 Cong. Rec. pt. 8, at 9078 (1935) (remarks of Representative Patman).
Despite its inadequacies, the original Clayton Act provided some protection against competitive injury among buyers. See George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278
U.S. 245 (1929); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 899 (1931).
10. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958) (Supp. 1I1, 1959-1961).
11. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 546-53 (1960).
12. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945).
13. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957); General Motors Corp., 50
F.T.C. 54 (1953).
14. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948); see generally Note,
74 Harv. L. Rev. 1597 (1961).
15. The three defenses enumerated in §§ 2(a) and 2(b) are: (1) the meeting in good
faith of an equally low price of a competitor, (2) a price reduction making allowance
for cost savings, and (3) a reduction in response to changing market conditions, such as
those involving seasonable, perishable or obsolescent products. Although admittedly
available, these defenses are rarely employed successfully. See Comment, 29 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 355 n.1 (1962). Although the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws noted that "not a single seller in a recorded case to date [19551 has succeeded in finally justifying a challenged discrimination by recourse to Section 2(b)'s
'meeting competition' defense" (Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 181 (1955)), the
defense has since been used with success. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465
(5th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 984 (1962) ; Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms
Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
16. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961). Sec-
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represent an acknowledgement by Congress that price discrimination must be
permitted in certain instances lest the act precipitate widespread price conspiracies, and perhaps cause the same detrimental effects it was designed to
7
prevent.'
In Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,'8 the Supreme Court held that the defense of
meeting competition was a complete and absolute one, irrespective of actual
or potential injury to competition or its tendency to create a monopoly.10
Generally, however, the defense has been limited to cases where the price met
reasonably appears to be a lawful one,2 0 where the discrimination is truly
responsive to an actual competitive situation, 2 1 and where in good faith the
seller seeks "to meet, but not to beat" his2 3competitor's price.? - The burden
of proving this is, of course, on the seller.
The issue in the instant case was whether the defense is available to a seller
who makes discriminatory price reductions and thereby obtains new customers.
The hearing examiner apparently conceded that the defense may be employed
only where there is an "essentially defensive" price discrimination, and after
reviewing evidence of the cutthroat competitive conditions in Sunshine's
Cleveland market, concluded that Sunshine's action was basically defensive,
and, hence, permissible. The Commission disagreed and held that the market
tion 2(b) in pertinent part provides: "That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller
[from] rebutting the prima-fade case thus made by showing that his lower price . . .
to any purchaser . . . was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor . . . "
17. A Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 196, 262 (1954).
See also Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 131 (1955) where it is stated that: "For
a seller constrained by law to reduce prices to some only at the cost of reducing prices
to all may well end by reducing them to none." (Emphasis omitted.)
13. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
19. Id. at 241.
20. Where a competitor's price is dearly unlawful, as in industry-wide collusive pricing,
the defense of meeting competition is no justification. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746, 753-54 (1945); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945). But the
practical difficulty of a seller's inquiry into the legality of a competitor's price has been
acknowledged, and in meeting prices, whether lawful or not, "it vll he sufficient . . .
if respondent did not know their legal status, or should not have known it." E. Eddmann
& Co., 51 F.T.C. 97S, 996 (1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 941 (1953).
21. The cases prohibiting the adoption of collusive pricing systems are alo appropriate
authority in this instance. See note 20 supra. But the "responsive to an actual price"
requirement, rather than involved with legality of price, is intended to limit the scope
of the defense to individual competitive situations as opposed to matching a competitor's
entire pricing system, or to meet future competition. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v.
FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
22. In Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) the Supreme Court stated that
the defense was "limited to a price reduction made to meet in good faith an equally low
price of a competitor" and did not permit "reductions which undercut the 'ower price'
of a competitor." Id. at 241-42.
23. General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. S85, 890 (1954).
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conditions had no bearing on the issue. Since the defense presupposes competition, the Commission ruled that it was not available in situations in which
Sunshine "was not faced with loss of a customer and did not lower its price
to retain a customer ... [because] its actions were not defensive .... ,24
To support its limitation on the scope of the defense, the Commission relied
on Standard Oil Co. v. FTC25 and Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC.2 0
In Standard Oil, a case involving price favoritism to retail jobbers who frequently sold directly to the public in competition with Standard's regular
retailers, the Supreme Court alluded to the defensive nature of "meeting
competition" and stated that the core of the defense "consists of the provision
that wherever a lawful lower price of a competitor threatens to deprive a
seller of a customer, the seller, to retain that customer, may in good faith
meet that lower price." 2 7 Standard Motor concerned an industry-wide discriminatory pricing pattern which encouraged the formation of joint purchasing
groups among distributors. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
rejecting Standard Motor's proof of the absence of injury to individual distributors, re-emphasized that the requisite proof of injury is satisfied by
showing a mere possibility of injury to competition in general. The court,
therefore, denied a valid meeting competition defense, relying in part on
Standard Oil, because "petitioner [had] gained many new customers,' 21 8 and
the defense was available "only if . . . [the price discrimination was] used
'2 9
defensively to hold customers rather than to gain new ones."
Commissioner Elman, in a vigorous dissent in the instant case, asserted
that neither the statute itself nor prior decisions required a distinction between
"aggressive" and "defensive" price reductions, and that the distinction is
practically unworkable and economically unsound.30 He questioned the
feasibility of the Commission's standard, asking how long an "old" customer
retains his classification after he discontinues his purchases, and when he
becomes a "new" customer "and hence unapproachable because Section 2(b)

no longer applies.

. . .31

He concluded that it would be almost impossible to

make this distinction with such clarity and consistency as would provide
businessmen with reasonable guidelines concerning what they may or may not
lawfully do. 32 To enforce the statute without imposing an undue burden on
the parties, Commissioner Elman would, therefore, require the hearing examiner
to give greater consideration to the good faith meeting of a lawful price.8 3
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit distinguished
on factual grounds both Standard Oil and Standard Motor, and adopted the
24. Sunshine Biscuits,
25. 340 U.S. 231.
26. 265 F.2d 674 (2d
27. 340 U.S. at 242.
28. 265 F.2d at 677.
29. Ibid.
30. Sunshine Biscuits,
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 20350.

Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 15469, at 20346 (FTC Orders) (1961).
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959).
(Emphasis added.)

Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 15469, at 20347 (FTC Orders) (1961).
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dissenting Commissioner's contention that the "gaining of new customers"
test was unworkable and economically unsound.34 It pointed out that the issue
in Standard Oi was whether "meeting competition" was an absolute defense,
or merely procedural, and that the question of gaining customers was not
before the Supreme Court. Although "gaining customers" was an issue in
StandardMotor, the present court noted that it was merely incidental. Futhermore, there the court relied solely on dictum in Standard Oil. Finally, the
court summarily dismissed the Robinson-Patman Act's legislative history as
inconclusive, 30 and focused on the plain meaning of "purchaser" within the
context of section 2(b), stating that "no connotation of the term is justified
that would limit its meaning to those purchasers who had been customers
of the seller before his lowering of prices to meeting those of a competitor." 3
A survey of commentators indicates near unanimity in condemning the Commission's refusal to permit the gaining of customers under the defense of
meeting competition.33 One authority impliedly agrees with Commissioner
Elman's dissenting opinion which rejected the distinction between "aggressive"
and "defensive" price reductions. 39 However, on close examination he seems
to agree more with the hearing examiner's view that "meeting competition" must
be genuinely defensive in nature, and that depending upon the competitive
situation, incidental customer gains may be permissible within the context
of an essentially defensive maneuver.40 Thus, he maintains that "the controversy
over this issue may be due to an oversimplified equation of gaining customers
with commercial aggression ...
.
In the instant case, both the court of appeals and the dissenting opinion of the
Commission specifically refer to the discussion of Standard Oil in the Report of
the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. The
Report states that
Standard Oil does not confine the "good faith" proviso solely to defensitw reductions
to retain an exsthig customer. The Supreme Court . . . did not promulgate a
general doctrine surrounding each seller with a protected circle of customers which
may be exploited without fear of a rival's price attacks.42
This and other similar statements 43 indicate an apparent disregard of the
34. 305 F.2d at 52.
35. Id. at 51.
36. Ibid.
37. 306 F.2d at 51-52.
3S. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 247 (1962); Handler,
Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 425-26
(1962); Shniderman, The Impact of the Robinson-Patman Act on Pricing Flexibility, 57
N1w. U.L. Rev. 173, 173 (1962); Comment, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 355, 357-53 n.S (1952); 7S
Harv. L. Rev. 1235, 1236-37 (1962).
39. Rowe, supra note 33, at 247.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 1S4 (1955).
43. See, e.g., Comment, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 355 (1962) where, in reference to the instant
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distinction between the effect of gaining new customers in the primary line
injury case and the same situation in the secondary line case. They seem to
suggest that the mere gaining of a new customer through price discrimination
would amount to a prima facie primary line violation. But as already noted,
a distinction is made in the proof of injury, i.e., more extensive evidence is
required to show a primary line injury.4 4 Consequently, evidence that a seller
made no significant increase in his share of the market would seemingly indicate an absence of injury to primary line competition, an essential element
of a section 2(a) violation, and thus eliminate the need for reliance upon the
defense.
This reasoning does not apply to a secondary line injury as in the instant
case. Sunshine Biscuits' maintaining, or even decreasing, of its percentage
share of the market does not mean that there may not be injury to the competitive positions of those customers against whom Sunshine discriminated. Sunshine's gaining of customers by discriminating in price would not amount to a
primary line violation so long as Sunshine made no significant gain in its share
of the market, whereas any customer gains accomplished by price discriminations would indicate injury to secondary line competitors. In short, the distinction between primary and secondary line injuries makes difficult the
application of one general rule.
Standard Oil involved an alleged secondary line injury, and perhaps the
Supreme Court's dictum restricting "meeting competition" solely to retaining
customers should be understood to apply only to such cases. In Balian Ice
Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 45 a primary line case, this restriction was not
applied. There the district court held the defense of meeting competition was
available where customers were gained by sellers "confronted with diminishing
sales in an endeavor to keep their customers or gain others." 40 Without indicating that primary line cases are relied upon for authority, it has been
commented that "all the decisions which acknowledge that a seller's area-wide
price differential may be justifiable under Section 2(b) must presuppose that
new customers as well as old accounts can be swayed by the seller's blanket
price reduction ' 4 7 and that the "justification should be acceptable if it realistically maintains or restores the seller's market share .... ,,4
Standard Oil's dictum invites speculation on the proper interpretation of the
defense in a secondary line situation. It is submitted that "meeting competition"
in a secondary line case should be available only in an "essentially defensive"
situation; without this limitation the scope of the defense would be so broad
as to write out section 2(a). The survival, or perhaps better, the protection of
case, it was stated that "since it is possible to gain new customers and still do no more than
hold one's share of the market, such a distinction ["new customer-old customer"] seems
ill-advised." Id. at 357-58 n.8.
44. See notes 13 & 14 supra and accompanying text.
45. 104 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd, 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955),
350 U.S. 991 (1956).

46. 104 F. Supp. at 800. (Emphasis added.)
47. Rowe, supra note 38, at 247.
48. Ibid.

cert. denied,
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small business is an integral phase of "maintaining competition," and limiting

the meeting competition defense to retention of customers tends to achieve
that goal. The possible beneficial effects to competition on the seller or primary

level which the unrestricted defense might work should not be determinative.
Only if in practice the Commission's "new customer-old customer" distinction had proved unworkable, as Commissioner Elman and the court suggested it must, should it have been abandoned, and reliance placed on the hearing examiner's determination of a seller's good faith in his price discriminationA9
Warranty-Statute of Limitations-Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Warranty Accrues at Time of Sale.-Plaintiff, a utilities company,
purchased four generating sets from defendant in 1946, for use at plaintiff's plant in Vermont.' In 1955, more than six years after delivery and
installation at its plant, but less than six years after the generators ceased to
perform at full capacity, plaintiff brought suit for breach of the express and
implied warranties of suitability that the generators would be capable of
continuous operation at full capacity for a period of thirty years.2 The defendant
interposed the statute of limitations as a defense. 3 The supreme court dismissed
the complaint 4 and the appellate division affirmed.3 In a four to three decision49. But a ruling on a seller's "good faith" is a difficult, if not impos ible, determination
to make. Dean, Managerial Economics 53 (1951).
1. The Vermont contract was negotiated in 1946. A cause of action based on a breach
of warranty in relation to this contract was first commenced in an amended complaint
more than six years after the sale. Plaintiff also purchased generators from the defendant
for its plant in Arizona in 194S. In November, 1949, plaintiff sued the defendant in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York for breach of warranty in
connection with the Arizona sale. While the action was pending, the parties negotiated a
settlement agreement in May 1950, wherein the plaintiff waived all past, present and future
claims against the defendant, and the federal court action was discontinued. In 1954,
plaintiff again instituted proceedings against the defendant with regard to the 1943 cale.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's action was barred by the zettlement agreement. The waiver, however, did not apply to the Vermont contract of 1946.
Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 4G9, 414, 1S4 N.E2d 171, 173,
230 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (1962).
2. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 96(1) provides that "where the buyer ... makes known to
the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment . . . there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
3. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 4S(1) provides in substance that an action based on a contract,
whether express or implied, must be commenced within six years after the cause of action
accrues. The Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725(1), adopted by New York and effective on
September 27, 1964, has reduced the period in which to bring such an action based on
sales contracts to four years.
4. Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co. (Sup. CL), N.Y.U., June 16, 19O,
p. 12, coL 3.
5. Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 473, 222 N.Y.S.2d
246 (lst Dep't 1961) (per curiam). Justice Rabin, in his dissent, was of the opinion that
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in which the majority was divided three-to-one as to the controlling principlethe New York Court of Appeals affirmed.( Three judges 7 found that the
action for breach of an implied warranty of future durability was barred by the
six year statute of limitations which commenced to run at the time of the sale.
Judge Froessel,8 however, concurring with the majority in the dismissal of
the action, based his affirmance upon his interpretation of the contract as
excluding the existence of any implied warranties. Three dissenting judges,
reasoning that the warranty was prospective in nature and, therefore, could
not be deemed to have been breached until the future performance to which
it related failed, found that the action was not barred by the statute of
limitations. Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409,
184 N.E.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).
In construing the warranty as relating solely to the present condition of
the generators, Chief Judge Desmond applied what he put forth as the
established New York rule, that a cause of action for breach of warranty of
fitness and suitability accrues only at the time of the sale, 10 and that such an
action is barred after six years by the statute of limitations:
A warranty express or implied that a machine is so built that it should last 30 years
is a warranty of present characteristics, design and condition and should not be
stretched by implication into a specific promise enforcible at the end of 30 years.,

This reasoning was based on the rule formulated in the early case of Allen v.
Todd12 and more recently reiterated in Liberty Mit. Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn,
InC.,13 that an implied warranty of fitness relates to the existing or present conat least one of the warranties was such that its breach might not be discovered for a long
time and, therefore, it should be construed as prospective. Consequently, the rule that the
statute of limitations begins to run against an action for breach of warranty at the time
of the sale was not applicable. Id. at 477, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
6. Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d 171, 230
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).
7. Chief Judge Desmond wrote the opinion for three of the majority which Included
Judges Dye and Van Voorhis.
8. Judge Froessel voted for affirmance on the ground that under the terms of the contract, it was expressly agreed that the seller "'shall have no liability upon warranties
express or implied with respect to workmanship or material other than as [in the contract]
provided.'" The parties further agreed that "'the contract as so accepted and approved
shall become in all respects the sole agreement between the parties with respect to the
machinery forming the subject matter thereof.'" 11 N.Y.2d at 417-18, 184 N.E.2d at 175,
230 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (concurring opinion).
9. Judge Fuld wrote the dissenting opinion in which Judges Burke and Foster concurred.
10. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 57 N.Y.S.2d
707 (App. T. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 835, 61 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1st Dep't 1946).
11. 11 N.Y.2d at 417, 184 N.E.2d at 174, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
12. 6 Lans. 222 (4th Dep't 1872). Contra, Firth v. Richter, 49 Cal. App. 545, 196 Pac.
277 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920) ; Ingalls v. Angell, 76 Wash. 692, 137 Pac. 309 (1913).
13. 185 Misc. 689, 57 N.Y.S.2d 707 (App. T. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 835, 61 N.Y.S.2d
373 (1st Dep't 1946). Accord, Outwater v. Miller, 215 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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dition of the goods and, therefore,
may be breached only at the time of the
4
sale or at the time of delivery.'
The problem in the instant case, however, concerned not only the applicable
rule of law with respect to prospective warranties but also an intcrpretationof
the contract. Since three judges of the majority determined that a warranty of
fitness relates only to present facts, they bypassed the question of whether
any warranty is necessarily limited to the present condition of the goods. The
dissenting opinion determined that even a warranty of fitness is not so limited.15
Although the distinction between a present and a prospective warranty is
theoretically clear, 1 its application to specific facts has been uncertain in
New York. 17 Todd involved the sale of fruit trees in which the seller at the

time of delivery told the plaintiff that the trees were twenty-ounce apple
trees. Several years later, the trees bore fruit, but not of the variety described.
In an action for breach of an implied warranty, the court held the warranty to
be a present one and, therefore, breached at the time of sale.'3 Consequently,
the action was barred by the statute of limitations. 10 Todd indicated, however,
that the question of when a breach occurs depends entirely on the nature of
the warranty, i.e., whether it is present or prospective. If it is present, then any
breach must occur at the time of the sale.20 On the other hand, if it is
prospective, the breach must occur in the future, and the statute of limitations
would not commence to run until the happening or failure of the event to which
it relates. 2'
Outside New York, varying tests have been advanced to determine when
a warranty is prospective. One view is that an implied warranty is prospective
if, first, it relates to the future state of the goods and, second, if it appears that
the buyer may discover the breach only when some future facts come into
existence. 2 Although, in such a case, the seller's statement may pertain to the
present as well as the future condition, such implied warranties are nevertheless
prospective in character.2 3 A recent Texas decision adopted the more liberal
rule that the statute of limitations commences on a breach of an implied
warranty of suitability only after the buyer discovers or should have
14. The courts use the terms "at the time of sale" and "at the time of delivery" to avoid
the misunderstanding that some future time is not intended.
15. 11 N.Y.2d at 419, 184 N.E.2d at 176, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 200.

16. See Allen v. Todd, 6 Lans. 222, 224 (4th Dep't 1S72).
17. There is dictum inAllen v. Todd, supra note 16, to the effect that an implied 'warranty may be prospective. Although the court held the warranty there to be present, it is
not clear on precisely what grounds this result was reached. Todd went no further on appeaL
Apparently, a definitive ruling on the question of whether an implied warranty of suitability
and fitness for the buyer's purpose can extend to performance in the future, i.e., a prospcctive warranty, has never been given by the court of appeals.
18. 6 Lans. 222 (4th Dep't 1872).
19. Ibid.
20. Id. at 224.
21. Ibid.
22. E.g, Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897 (1961).
23. E.g., Kennard & Sons Carpet Co. v. Dornan, 64 Mo. App. 17 (1895).
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reasonably discovered the breach.2 4 Although such warranties are not characterized as "prospective," the rule which governs in fraud cases (that the statute
begins to run from the time the
breach should reasonably have been dis25
covered) is applied analogously.
In Woodworth v. Rice Bros.,26 New York recognized that an express warranty
may be prospective. There the court of appeals affirmed an appellate division
holding that a seller's representation that a certain variety of trees would bear
a specific fruit was a prospective warranty since it looked towards a specific
future act. It was not breached until the trees failed to bear the particular
fruit at the time warranted.27 Although Woodworth and most other cases
which found warranties to be prospective involved express representations by
the seller, 28 there would appear to be no inherent contradiction between a
warranty of future performance or durability and a warranty which is
implied. Consequently, there is no valid reason for denying at least the
possibility of an implied warranty that looks towards future performance.
Both the Todd and Woodworth cases recognized that a warranty, express or
implied, is not necessarily limited to the present condition of the goods. Although Chief Judge Desmond did not expressly deny the possibility of a
prospective warranty, his language suggests that Todd represented a New
York rule which did not recognize prospective warranties at all.-0 While
Todd and Woodworth appear to be inconsistent on their facts, neither decision
categorically said that there can be no prospective warranty in New York.
On the contrary, both cases recognized the possibility of a prospective warranty.
Neither decision-as Chief Judge Desmond implied-foreclosed the possibility
of such a warranty merely because the promise for the future was in some way
related to the present characteristicsof the goods. 30
Chief Judge Desmond stated the New York law was settled that a warranty
24. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc. v. S. Riekes & Sons, Inc., 351 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961).
25. Id. at 121-22.
26. 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y. Supp. 722 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 193 App. Div. 971, 184
N.Y. Supp. 958 (4th Dep't 1920), aff'd mem., 233 N.Y. 577, 135 N.E. 925 (1922).
27. 110 Misc. at 161-62, 179 N.Y. Supp. at 724.
28. E.g., Southern Cal. Enterprises v. D. N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 178
P.2d 785 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947). See generally 2 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability
§ 40.01(2) (1961).
29. 11 N.Y.2d at 416, 184 N.E.2d at 174, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
30. Todd, at least, recognized the possibility of a prospective warranty by distinguishing
such a warranty on the ground that it relates to a future event, even though the court
in Todd found that the warranty there was present. Following this distinction, Woodworth
found an express representation that trees would bear a specific fruit'to be prospective, thus
reaching a result different from Todd on substantially the same facts. In the light of the
factual similarity between Todd and Woodworth, any distinction between those cases would
seem superficial at best. Woodworth attempted to distinguish Todd on the ground that the
warranty in the latter case looked towards the nature of the trees rather than the type of
fruit they would bear. Such a distinction, however, would not seem feasible In most
situations.
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of quality is present in nature-thus suggesting that Woodworth had been
overruled sub silentio. Even if this is so, it does not follow that such a warranty
may not be accompanied by an additional understanding that the product will
perform according to a fixed standardin the future. In considering this problem,
Professor Williston has observed that:
what is in terms a promise for the future may also involve a representation as to the
present. This should not deprive the buyer ... of the full statutory period after the
promise is actually broken in the future.31
In his dissenting opinion, judge Fuld disagreed with the Chief judge's
reasoning on the ground that there were facts sufficient to show the possibility
of an implied promise as to the future performance of the generators. He based
this premise upon the nature of the goods and the purpose for which they were
purchased?32 Unless the generators had a life span of thirty years and would
operate for that length of time as warranted, they would not be "fit" for the
plaintiff's purpose.3 3 Thus, the dissenting opinion viewed Section 96 of the
New York Personal Property Law as permitting an implied warranty that was
prospective in character?. 4 As judge Fuld reasoned, the mere fact that the
warranty also related to the present condition of the generators was not in
itself sufficient to deny its prospective character?35 The dissenting opinion
thus suggested that a warranty might be both present and prospective concurrently, since one of these characteristics need not, in every case, be repugnant
to the other. judge Fuld cited decisions of other jurisdictions which had
recognized prospective warranties both express and implied. Aced v. HobbsSesack Plumbing Co.,3 6 for example, held that an implied warranty might be
prospective even "though accompanied by a representation as to present
condition. 37 Applying the rationale of Aced, Judge Fuld concluded that
the possibility of a prospective warranty could not be denied in the case at bar
even though it related to the present condition of the generators and was
implied 3 s
Writing for three judges of the majority, Chief judge Desmond recognized
an "element of unfairness" in requiring the plaintiff to sue within six years
after the purchase, when plaintiff's purpose required a durability of greater
than six years and the machines were built to last no longer than that period.
But in attributing such unfairness to the New York rule "which makes all
limitations . . . run from breach and not from discovery,"39 the Chief judge
seemed to beg the fundamental question as to when the breach actually
occurred.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

1 Williston, Sales § 212a (rev. ed. 194S).
11 N.Y.2d at 419-21, 134 N.E.2d at 176-77, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02.
Id. at 421, 184 N.E.2d at 177, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
Ibid.
Id. at 419, 184 N.E.2d at 176, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897 (1961).
Id. at 583-84, 360 P.2d at 903.
11 N.Y.2d at 419, 184 N.E2d at 176, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
Id. at 417, 184 N.E.2d at 175, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
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The opinion of three judges of the majority would seem to abolish any
possibility of a prospective warranty in New York, and, in effect, limit every
warranty of quality, suitability or durability to the statutory duration of six
years. Such a restriction not only would effect a hardship with respect to
the length of time within which an action might be brought, but would deny
any right to redress whenever the truth of the warranty might not be
40
ascertained within the statutory period.
Although it is axiomatic that limitations run from the time of the breach
rather than from its discovery, 41 the determination of when a breach does
occur is a judicial function which, in the instant case, part of the court
abdicated.
Perhaps fortunately, by its peculiar division, the instant court has left
that question open. While no mechanistic test-other than the intention of
the parties-might be established to determine the prospective character of a
warranty, the courts should find a prospective warranty in the proper circumstances. Although the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a breach of
warranty occurs when the tender of delivery is made,'42 it recognizes that a
warranty may be prospective if it "explicitly extends to future performance of
the goods," 43 and, therefore, the action accrues only "when the breach is or
should have been discovered.1 44 The court of appeals will undoubtedly be
asked to define the circumstances in which such a warranty will arise. It is to
be hoped that it will not leave the question in its present unclarified state.
If New York is unwilling to hold that certain warranties may run for the
lifetime of a product, it might, at least, formulate a standard which would
give a buyer a reasonable time within which to ascertain the truthfulness of a
warranty which may be breached only in the distant future. Such a rule would
be consistent with reason and justice. When a warranty, express or implied,
clearly relates to a future event, or it is within the contemplation of the
parties that it have future effect, is it not more reasonable to follow the general
rule which allows parties to enter into contracts the performance of which
may not be fulfilled until some time in the future? It is both illogical and
unjust to hold that the parties to a sale may not warrant as to the future
performance of the goods, and that conditions subsequent may not be the very
essence of a warranty.
40. See Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (2d Dep't)
(memorandum decision), motion for leave to appeal denied, 8 N.Y.2d 711, 170 N.E.2d 834,
208 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1960).

41. In Allen v. Todd, 6 Lans. 222 (4th Dep't 1872), the court said: "Inability to
ascertain the quality or condition of property warranted to be, at the time of the sale, a
particular quality or in a certain condition, has never been allowed to change the rule as to
the time when a right of action for a breach of the warranty occurs." Id. at 224. The
N.Y. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725(2) (eft. Sept. 27, 1964) has codified this rule by
providing that "a cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach."
42. N.Y. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725(2) (eft. Sept. 27, 1964).
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.

